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ABSTRACT 
NATO’s enduring global preeminence owes to its ability to adapt to emerging security 
threats, but this capacity now may be limited. Today, NATO faces hybrid threats that 
combine conventional and unconventional means. On the one hand, hybrid threats may 
not constitute armed attacks under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. On the other hand, 
NATO nations are both enriched and endangered by cyberspace, mass media, and the 
growing global interdependency of easily accessible technologies that once were 
possessed only by nation-states but now can serve as weapons in hands of the rogue state 
and non-state actors. This thesis examines NATO’s ability to defend against hybrid 
threats. First it analyzes the historical development of internal issues that make NATO 
vulnerable to outside threats. Then, through two case studies, it examines the external 
threats projected by hybrid threat actors. Finally, it turns to NATO’s strategic capabilities 
against hybrid threat actors. The thesis concludes that NATO’s well-established habits of 
burden-sharing and burden-shifting exacerbate the lag in developing the policy 
framework to deal with hybrid threats. Still, NATO can turn to its New Strategic Concept 
and the Smart Defense initiative to counter and deter hybrid threats, thus managing 
threats that cannot be fully prevented.   
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I. THE DILEMMA OF HYBRID CONFLICT 
The proliferation of violence and the rise of forces outside the conventional 
institutions of state pose a major challenge for soldiers and armies in the Euro-Atlantic 
realm. NATO’s political, military, and collective defense planning authorities now must 
contend with such new and forming issues as states like China, Russia, or Iran that 
consider the exercise of violence as an effective method for increasing their political 
power positions; groups of radical individuals using their religious fundamentalism or 
sociopolitical suffering as the justification—or imperative—for terror and violence (e.g., 
Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Taliban); the increasing impact of modern technologies on state 
security; and the use of non-state actors to achieve state’s political goals as, for example, 
in the cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 or the war against Georgia in 2008. The 
experience of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in post-conflict security 
building in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the advent of such new threats as Internet 
crime, bulk as further problems of security and defense in a way unimagined two decades 
ago. Makers of NATO policy both within the organization as well as in NATO capitals 
speak of “hybrid conflicts”—where threats are “posed by adversaries with the ability to 
simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit 
of their objectives.”1  
The new nomenclature may not, as yet, bespeak a complete or comprehensive 
strategic response, however.  The aim of the thesis is to determine whether NATO, with 
its existing strategy, forces, and capabilities, is able to defend itself from hybrid threats 
and engage in the hybrid conflicts that are almost certainly in the offing. This work also 
assesses the kinds of challenges hybrid threats pose to NATO, as a collective defense 
organization, and the external and internal factors of armed force, state, society and 
economy that make the Alliance and its members vulnerable. 
 
                                                 
1 Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Supreme Allied Command Transformation, “Bi-SC Input to a New NATO 
Capstone Concept to Countering Hybrid Threats”, 25 August, 2010, 9. 
 2 
During the Cold War, NATO’s strategy and policy concentrated on questions of 
how to defend from other state actors that projected military and nuclear threats into the 
Alliance. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, NATO has gained experience in 
fighting irregular wars with Taliban and Al Qaeda that hardly could be considered as 
state representatives or classic conventional actors. Now with growing global 
interdependency and easy access to the most modern communication and information 
technologies, NATO faces an enemy that is neither a conventional state actor nor an 
irregular/non-conventional non-state actor using asymmetric warfare methods. Instead, 
NATO confronts a nebulous adversary that adapts itself to prevailing obstacles and 
creates modes of threats that are the most dangerous to NATO at an exact time and place: 
All future conflicts will have a cyber dimension, whether in stealing 
secrets and probing vulnerabilities to prepare for a military operation or in 
disabling crucial information and command and control networks of the 
adversary during the operation itself. Consequently, NATO’s future 
military effectiveness will be closely linked to its cyber-defense 
capabilities; in this respect, there is also much that NATO can do to help 
allies improve their cyber forensics, intrusion detection, firewalls, and 
procedures for handling an advanced persistent attack, such as that which 
affected Estonia in 2007.2 
The contemporary hybrid threat actor has the advantage of access to modern 
technologies, arms, weapon systems, and media that used to be under the exclusive 
control of the most powerful NATO countries, which also possessed significant human, 
technical, and financial resources to invent state-of-art armament for their military. 
Nowadays organized crime syndicates have worldwide connections from Somalia to 
Afghanistan; Al Qaeda operators or even a lone computer-hacker who supports Russian 
foreign policy initiatives can use cyberspace in order to attack critical infrastructure 
objects in Germany, the computerized command system of the nuclear power plant in 
California, or government and bank websites in Estonia. Hybrid threat actors also have 
all the necessary elements to prepare improvised explosive devices that have not only 
                                                 
2 Jamie Shea “Keeping NATO Relevant,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook, April 
2012, 12. 
 3 
attacked NATO troops in the southern provinces of Afghanistan but also killed civilian 
subway passengers in London and Madrid or tourists on a bus in Bulgaria.3  
The worst case—by no means remote or improbable—is a hybrid threat actor that 
has full access to mass media and creates its own narrative to influence the hearts and 
minds of NATO populations. For instance, political saboteurs with unclear financial 
sources were able to organize a referendum in Latvia, attempting to create socio-ethnic 
conflict in the NATO member state bordering with Russia.4 As such, fears among NATO 
populations about unpredictable attacks on their daily lives differ from the threats and 
threat perceptions of and in NATO during the Cold War. These changed circumstances 
demand an adaptation of policy and strategy as well as the reform of the NATO 
command structure, smart use of the existing capabilities, and effective strategic, 
operational and tactical interoperability. Is NATO up to the task? 
A. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Hybrid threats defy an easy definition, just as the range of responses to them often 
blurs into fields that once were very distant from the military realm. Thus, the next 
chapter is devoted to an explanation of the interrelationship among hybrid conflict, 
hybrid warfare, and hybrid threats, on the one hand, and classic theories of conventional 
and unconventional types of threats, war, and warfare, on the other. The points of 
overlap, as well as the points of divergence, are vital basic elements of an understanding 
of hybrid conflict. 
Chapter III analyzes the historic experience of NATO’s engagement with external 
and internal threats since the establishment of the Alliance. This chapter gives a historic 
evaluation on NATO’s defense capabilities against a state-of-the-art enemy possessing 
                                                 
3 The Economist “London Under Attack: After the Joy of Winning the Olympics, Evil Came Swiftly,” July 7, 
2005 http://www.economist.com/node/4166694 (accessed 07/27/2012), Paul Hamilos “The Worst Islamic Attack in 
European History,” The Guardian, 31 October, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/31/spain (accessed 
07/27/2012), Ognyan Minchev “International Terrorism Comes to Bulgaria,” German Marshall Fund Blog Expert 
Commentary, 26 July, 2012, http://blog.gmfus.org/2012/07/26/international-terrorism-comes-to-bulgaria/ (accessed 
07/27/2012). 
4 The Economist “Latvia’s Referendum: What’s My Language,” February 14, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/02/latvias-referendum (accessed 07/27/2012). 
 4 
conventional and nuclear capabilities, as well as against those threats that the world 
experienced right after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  NATO’s capabilities to sustain a 
collective defense shield in the age of hybrid conflict will be understood best by linking 
the Alliance’s past experiences with contemporary challenges. This chapter seeks to 
answer the question of whether NATO’s policies and strategic performance have been 
more affected by external threats of conventional and nuclear nature or whether the 
biggest vulnerability to NATO is its internal fracture points.  
Chapter IV presents a case study of cyberspace violence, namely the 2007 attack 
on Estonia and 2008 attack on Georgia as part of conventional conflict. Aside from the 
political and technological challenges that NATO faces in dealing with cyber threats, 
special attention is paid to the legal challenges that attend this issue, specifically the lack 
of an internationally binding legal regime. This case study emphasizes the strategic 
importance of hybrid threats and the consequences they might have on NATO if that was 
involved in hybrid conflict where engagement in cyberspace is unavoidable. 
Chapter V presents a case study of a state/hybrid threat actor and its modus 
operandi in a real hybrid conflict situation, the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. For this 
purpose the author will analyze the Russian Federation’s policy and strategy, with an eye 
toward Russia’s attempts to spread its influence over the neighboring regions using 
means other than conventional force that are political and economic sanctions, cyber 
attacks, media propaganda and sabotage. At the very latest, the Russian-Georgian conflict 
put NATO on notice that hybrid threats are real and pressing—and demand strategic 
consideration and response. 
To the extent that hybrid threats represent a continuity of “existential” challenges 
to NATO, which have been present almost since the creation of the Alliance, Chapter VI 
focuses on the contemporary threat environment and the strategic shift of the Alliance 
after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. soil in September 11, 2001. This chapter analyzes 
whether hybrid threats project continuity or discontinuity of challenges that NATO has 
experienced throughout the history and calls significant attention to the issues about 
NATO’s readiness to face challenges that hybrid threats and hybrid warfare bring with 
them. 
 5 
Based on these findings, the present work concludes with recommendations for 
policy, strategy, and operations, in which assessments of a certain conservatism must 
operate about the generalized willingness to expand the range of secure threats in a 
turbulent world. After all, NATO does not have capacity to defend its populations 
completely from all types of threats. Moreover, NATO as an organization does not 
possess unlimited political power or financial and military resources to fight against 
every state, non-state actor, or organization that presents a threat to the Alliance. “Smart 
Defense,” particularly where hybrid threats are concerned, is smartest where it accounts 
for the limitations of this reality and sets policy and practical priorities accordingly. 
B. DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEMS 
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, revolutions in technology, terrorist attacks on 
major European cities, cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007, the Russian invasion in 
Georgia in 2008, the financial crisis and stagnating economies in the Western world, the 
rise of new world powers in Southeast Asia, the rebirth of worldwide extremism and 
nationalism in state national policies, stagnating demography, war in Libya, and growing 
tensions within Syria—which has an 822-kilometer border with NATO member 
Turkey—all of this serves as an opening stage explaining the strategic environment in 
which NATO must continue the functioning and sustainment of its performance at the 
same level of previous decades. Above all for NATO:  
At least six other issues illustrate the changing dimensions of collective 
defense: missile defense, cyber-warfare, space operations, state-sponsored 
WMD terrorism, political–military dynamics in the Middle East and the 
Asia–Pacific region, and the risk of a non-Article 5 operation becoming a 
collective defense contingency.5 
All of the events that happened in last decade, as well as these dimensions of 
collective defense, contribute to a better understanding of what hybrid threats are because 
none of them represent a straight conventional or unconventional nature but instead of 
create an interrelationship between different threat actors and modes of warfare.  
                                                 
5 David S. Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the Next Strategic Concept,” International Affairs 86:2 (2010): 
507 
 6 
If these episodes do not represent hybrid conflict that NATO is experiencing in 
different dimensions of the international, regional, and national realms, then what kind of 
conflict/war/crisis is it really? Moreover, is NATO able to protect its member states and 
populations from hybrid threats? Does NATO have the potential to fight hybrid conflict? 
Are hybrid threats strictly of an external nature or do they represent internal weaknesses 
of NATO? What are the internal issues that characterize NATO’s strategic advantages or 
disadvantages in front of new threats and competing power centers? Has NATO created 
the right strategic posture to withstand hybrid threats and engage in hybrid conflicts? Do 
hybrid threats mean necessity for new model of deterrence? Has the New Strategic 
Concept provided answers to how NATO is going to defend its allies against hybrid 
threats?  
This thesis argues that NATO has not prepared itself for hybrid threats and is not 
ready to fight a hybrid conflict; moreover, it has limited capabilities to prevail in such a 
conflict because it faces a continuity of the problems that have been weakening the 
Alliance since its inception. New challenges have emerged creating hybrid threat 
constellations where threats from the past have mixed with new types of threats. 
Politically and strategically new thinking is required which was reflected in the new 
Strategic Concept and Chicago Summit Communiqué but still must be implemented in 
the daily practice of Alliance’s agenda.  
The biggest issue for the Alliance is that every new war it fights brings new rules 
and conditions while allied armies and defense professionals eagerly want to fight every 
new war in the same manner they fought the last. This is not to say that NATO must 
occupy itself with prophecies about future wars. Yet, this habit is an invitation, if not an 
opportunity, for those state and non-state actors who might be interested in launching 
hybrid warfare. After surviving the first decade of the twenty first century, experiencing 
the longest war in the history of the Alliance as well as the most significant enlargement 
of organization on the other side, the Alliance faces hard a task, which is to ‘paint the 
 7 
face on the faceless enemy’ and to develop the hybrid threat concept, as well as 
examining viable and effective strategies to meet hybrid threats.6  
This is not the first time, nor is it a unique situation, for the Alliance to have new 
forms of threats and conflicts that threaten the North-Atlantic community. NATO has 
been in the security business too long to be surprised by the fact that security is 
permanently changing and that states, alliances, and their organizations must adapt to 
new situations. According to Zbigniew Brezinski  
[The] Alliance has survived three monumental transformations of the 
world that are: the end of centuries long war in the West; the U.S. 
commitment to defend Europe from the Soviet Union after the World War 
II, and more recently; the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.7  
So a hybrid threat and subsequent hybrid conflict might basically be a question of 
adaptation and transformation.  
It is hard, however, to imagine that the politicians, diplomats, and militaries that 
have experienced the nuclear arms race, the Cuban missile crisis or even World War II 
and who are still around NATO, could take the concept of hybrid threats and hybrid 
conflict as being more dangerous than any of their past experiences with crises during the 
twentieth century. Nevertheless, hybrid threats seem to have something in common with 
nuclear threats and nuclear war. Until there are no longer nuclear weapons on Earth, there 
is a permanent threat of nuclear war. Similarly, neither hybrid threats nor hybrid conflict 
can be solved completely. Just like nuclear threats, hybrid threats can be manageable to  
 
                                                 
6 Aaronson et al. cited Brigadier General Roy Hunstock, Final Plenary, “Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid 
Threats [MCCHT] Experiment,” Tallinn, Estonia, May 13, 2011 https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/ACTIPT/ 
JOUIPT/20102011CH/Experiment in Michael Aaronson, Sverre Diessen, Yves De Kermabon, Mary Beth Long, 
Michael Miklaucic “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” PRISM 2:4, National Defense University Press (September, 
2011): 112.  
7 Zbigniew Brezinski “An Agenda for NATO: Toward a Global Security Web,” Foreign Affairs 88:5, (September/ 
October 2009): 1. Additionally, the NATO Expert Group that prepared analysis and recommendations on a new 
strategic concept noted that “already Harmel Report mentioned that NATO is an Alliance that is constantly adapting 
itself to changing conditions with two core functions that are maintaining strength and solidarity to deter aggression 
and to pursue more stable long-term political environment” in “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: 
Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO,” NATO Public 
Diplomacy Division (17 May, 2010): 7.  
 8 
certain extent, guaranteeing a defined level of security to NATO and its allies. In some 
aspects, however, when it concerns hybrid threats the situation might be even more 
complicated because they represent dangers that: 
could come in the form of conventional attacks or provocative statements 
intended to serve as a means of political blackmail. They could arrive in 
forms with which we are familiar, or in hybrid variations that combine, for 
example, the stealth of a terrorist group with the power normally 
associated with a nation-state including purchased or purloined weapons 
of mass destruction.8 
This aspect of hybrid threats must be of the highest concern to NATO—the 
unknown form of hybrid threats and the different modes of how they could be applied. 
NATO’s civilian and military experts must start here to find out the solution against 
threats that have been created in response to NATO’s own vulnerability on the one hand 
and potential adversaries’ strength, which still must be understood, on the other hand.9  
C. DIMENSIONS AND SOURCES OF HYBRID THREATS 
 Hybrid threats emerge among other types of threats and forms of warfare and use 
different sources in order to attain their political goal. This conjunctive dimension is key.  
There exists no single, namable danger in the world that someone would definitely 
characterize as a pure hybrid threat. Hybrid threats are rather: 
 
 
                                                 
8 “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of 
Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO,” NATO Public Diplomacy Division (17 May, 2010): 15. 
9 NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General Jamie Shea cited in Aaronson et al. “NATO Countering the Hybrid 
Threat,” 117 There are other experts that have addressed NATO’s vulnerability against modern threats of whom hybrid 
threats must be considered as essential part. NATO Expert Group has come to conclusion that “New types of threats 
exist and NATO must respond to them. Among them one can find such threat as political intimidation and regional 
disputes [and] Non-conventional threats are even much higher to NATO than conventional. Their profile creates the 
situation when it is necessary to provide Alliance’s defense but not at the level of Article 5.” in “NATO 2020: Assured 
Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept 
for NATO,” 6-9. Moreover, several authors have contributed that there are “new, historically unprecedented risks to 
global security what NATO has to withstand” in Brezinski “An Agenda for NATO: Toward a Global Security Web,” 
Foreign Affairs 88:5, (September/ October 2009): 5 and that hybrid threats “employ a complex blend of means that 
includes the orchestration of diplomacy, political interaction, humanitarian aid, social pressures, economic 
development, savvy use of the media and military force” in Aaronson et al. “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” 
PRISM 2:4, National Defense University Press (September, 2011):116. 
 9 
an umbrella term encompassing a wide variety of existing adverse 
circumstances and actions, such as terrorism, migration, piracy, 
corruption, ethnic conflict, and so forth. What is new, however, is the 
possibility of NATO facing the adaptive and systematic use of such means 
singularly and in combination by adversaries in pursuit of long-term 
political objectives.10 
In part because of the insidious imprecision of hybrid threats, one can speak 
separately of the social and technological dimensions of which NATO should be aware.  
In other words, NATO must learn where to look for both the evidence and effects of 
hybrid threats if it wants to craft a useful strategy to combat them. 
1. Sociology of Hybrid Threats 
Hybrid threat actors effectively manage to manipulate the advantages that the 
globalization and information age provides. Hybrid threats might be applied by both state 
and non-state actors in a manner that would make it difficult for NATO to go after the 
perpetrator and punish the rogue actor in the old-fashioned way of a conventional or even 
irregular response.11 Thus, NATO is forced to adapt its traditional definition of collective 
defense in the twenty-first century, where war may not be an armed attack but a variety 
of hostile actions designed to weaken a state or the Alliance as a whole facing a 360-
degree battle space without a clear frontline or rules of engagement.12 Here NATO finds 
itself facing a strategic dilemma of how to respond in situations when state or non-state 
actors create non-Article 5 situations to separate members of the Alliance, which, 
however, result in Article 5 conditions. For example, NATO experienced cyber-attacks 
against its member country Estonia in 2007, which are accepted, though without 
“smoking-gun” proof, to have come directly from Russia or Russian territory; similarly 
cutoffs of gas supplies that run through Ukraine left populations in such NATO countries 
                                                 
10 Aaronson et al., “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” 115. 
11 Aaronson et al., “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” 115. 
12 Phillip R. Cuccia, Implications of a Changing NATO (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania:  Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2010), 9; James M. Goldgeier “The Future of NATO,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council Special Report No. 51, (February, 
2010): 4; Samuel Grier NATO and 21st Century War, (NATO Defense College, Rome: Occasional Papers Series, 
October, 2007), 8. 
 10 
as Romania and Bulgaria freezing in the dark at the coldest time of year.13 In these two 
examples, the NATO intelligence community was able to find some traces that connected 
their suspicions to a certain state-actor. These traces did not give NATO political 
authorization to make diplomatic sanctions or organize force projections as a more visible 
gesture of convincing the Russian Federation to avoid doing something similar in future.  
It might be worse if hybrid threats emerge in the ungoverned space created by 
state and non-state actors that have united their capacities in order to challenge NATO. 
The cyber-attacks against Estonia demonstrate this possibility of conducting hybrid 
warfare without specifying and tracing the name of the adversary. Moreover, 
technological capability allows for the execution of hybrid warfare independently through 
multi-modal activities that can be conducted by separate units, or even by 
the same unit but are generally operationally and tactically directed and 
coordinated within the main battle space to achieve synergistic effects in 
the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict whereas the novelty 
of this combination and the innovative adaptations of existing systems by 
the hybrid threat is a further complexity.14  
Hybrid threats are a man-made issue that requires NATO defense planners to have 
a new understanding of the ways and means a potential adversary might apply specific 
threats against the North Atlantic community. Subsequently, understanding hybrid threats 
does not mean a request for new resources or trying to squeeze out additional financial 
donations from the United States or NATO’s European side, which is still trying to 
recover from the crisis in the Eurozone. Instead of buying new hardware, NATO should 
seek solutions on the basis of existing capabilities but through the reevaluation of the exit 
strategy and greater use of a comprehensive approach concept in crisis management.15  
                                                 
13 Goldgeier, “The Future of NATO,” 7. 
14 Frank Hoffman “The Hybrid Character of Modern Conflict,” in Paul Brister, William H. Natter, III, Robert R. 
Tomes ed. Hybrid Warfare and Transnational Threats: Perspectives for and Era of Persistent Conflict (New York: 
Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2011), 40. 
15 Aaronson et al., “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” 117. 
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2. Technology of Hybrid Threats 
There is a popular perception among defense professionals and political 
authorities that hybrid warfare basically means the use of modern technologies, especially 
those related to cyber space. The influence of cyber space or the role of computer 
technologies in the contemporary world is clear; it is, however, crucial to understand that 
technology itself is only a tool in hands of an individual who uses specific technical 
appliances in order to penetrate its adversary and reach possible strategic effect. In a 
word, the advances of technology work at least as much in favor of hybrid threat actors—
making hybrid warfare more effective and deadly—than they benefit the leading powers 
of NATO. Technology contributes to hybrid threats by “preparing and mobilizing forces 
of hybrid threat actor without visible assurances that subsequently might led to 
devastating attack against NATO allies and requiring to think about the ways and means 
how to deal with such kind of sudden crisis.”16  
In this regard, NATO must be aware that socio-political changes in the world, 
together with technological developments and their continued victorious march in the 
information age, have “unleashed a geo-technological explosion of communication 
between civilizations and continuing the acceleration of already increasing velocity of 
communications whose sheer volume further stimulates the political awakening and 
aspirations of formerly closed societies.”17 On the one hand, one can observe a positive 








                                                 
16 Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the Next Strategic Concept,” 489, see also David S. Yost “NATO and 
the Anticipatory Use of Force,” International Affairs 83:1, (2007): 44. 
17 Grier NATO and 21st Century War, 8,61. 
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without Internet communications and social networks where enthusiasts were able to start 
a mass mobilization of youth who had access and were user-friendly with these tools of 
the information age.18  
On the other hand, there are more negative examples indicating that technologies 
might have been used by hybrid threat actors that are not at all interested in democratic 
upheaval but instead threaten other states and their populations. The war between the 
terrorist organization Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 (officially the war between Israel and 
Lebanon) proved that even a non-state actor conventionally weaker than Israel could, 
through use of sophisticated weapon technologies and privately owned visual and 
electronic media, influence international society successfully by recreating the story of 
David’s battle against Goliath where Israel was put in the position of the aggressor on the 
basis of visual evidence, some of which turned out to be fake.19  
The other danger that the technological dimension of hybrid threats portends 
begins with the fact that NATO forces and crisis management institutions are absolutely 
dependent on modern technologies. Even a non-military attack against the NATO 






                                                 
18 There is not complete agreement that Arab Spring or at least revolutions in Egypt and Tunisya reached their 
extent because of the social media. There is, however, consensus that social media provided enough assistance enabling 
mass mobilization as well as providing information to international society. See Lisa Anderson “Demistifying the Arab 
Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisya, Egypt, and Libya,” Foreign Affairs 90:3, (May/June 2011): 2 
accessed on 07/11/2012 http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Anderson-Demystifying-the-
Arab-Spring.pdf , Mohamed Ben Moussa “The Use of Internet by Islamic Social Movements in Collective Action: The 
Case of Justice and Charity,” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Volume 8, Issue 2, (October, 2011): 
65-83 accessed on 07/11/2012 
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/116616/001eWPCC_Vol8issue2.pdf#page=163  
19 Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman “The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for 
Army and Defense Policy,” Strategic Studies Institute, (September, 2008): 4; Matt Matthews We Were Caught 
Unprepared: the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat 
Studies Institute Press, 2008), 16–22, Augustus R. Norton Hezbollah: A Short History, (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 137. 
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that provide a significant contribution to the collective defense posture, may lead to 
situation in which the Alliance is paralyzed, unable to provide an adequate response or 
protect populations in a quick and decisive manner.20  
Technology’s contribution to the hybrid threat footprint has been effective enough 
to create a political concern for Allied defense authorities. These authorities should find 
an answer to the question of what might be the best means of response and what kind of 
policies should be defined and implemented in the case that NATO experiences a cyber-
attack that might be considered an act of war or possibly serving only as the prelude to 
later adverse activities of conventional, irregular and/or criminal nature and thus creating 
the perfect execution of hybrid war.21 Finally, one should also agree that NATO is not a 
laboratory of information technology experts practicing in Silicon Valley and the 
capabilities of the Alliance to protect itself are very limited even though the Alliance has 
created the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability and there is the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence.22  
D. HYBRID THREAT ACTORS: CHALLENGERS OF INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY AND NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY 
 Hybrid threat actors can be both state and non-state actors or organizations they 
represent. Both entities have proven that they can successfully use international crime, 
illegal commerce, terrorism, and insurgency to achieve their political goals and combine 
these dimensions of violence together in different modes in order to bring about the 
greatest possible harm to the opponent.23 Both state and non-state actors may expose 
danger to NATO, even without having significant resources one can see or touch. For 
                                                 
20 David Yost argues that “The challenge is grave because, as the US Department of Defense noted in February 
2010, ‘In the 21st century, modern armed forces simply cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without 
resilient, reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace ... Moreover, the speed of 
cyber attacks and the anonymity of cyberspace greatly favor the offense. This advantage is growing as hacker tools 
become cheaper and easier to employ by adversaries whose skills are growing in sophistication.” One should agree that 
if that is an issue for the United States military then this must be similar concern of every other NATO member country 
and NATO all together, see Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the Next Strategic Concept,” 510. 
21 Robert Gates, Former US Secretary of Defense cited by David S. Yost in “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the 
Next Strategic Concept,” 509.  
22 Goldgeier, “The Future of NATO,” 14. 
23 Aaronson et al., “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” 116. 
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instance, the use of cyberspace for attacking and spreading violence against the 
Alliance’s critical infrastructure, military facilities or civilian entities can be realized 
from “remote locations, leaving no trail to determine their origin.”24 
1. State Actors: Friendly Users of Hybrid Threats  
 State actors are friendly users of hybrid warfare. Creating hybrid threats for such 
states such as the Russian Federation, Iran or China helps to challenge their opponents, 
whether these are separate states like the United States or they are members of a 
collective defense organization like NATO that the hybrid threat actor does not represent. 
There is, however, a certain division between state/-hybrid actors within their own 
community, which depends on their political, economic, and military power as well as 
their political ambitions especially those of an international scope. 
a. Failed States 
Failed states might be hybrid threat actors such as Afghanistan or Somalia 
thanks to the effects of globalization and the development of technologies and 
communications that anymore allow a distant place on the earth to no longer be 
disconnected from other states and geographic regions: 
Since the 19th century the world again has terra nullius zones of chaos 
that in previous ages were isolated from the world but not in nowadays 
because even without having law and order these places can have 
international airports (Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia).25 
Since 2000, and in even earlier some places (e.g., Somalia), NATO have 
had to address special attention to failed states and the dangers they employ against the 
North-Atlantic community and international society all together. Failed states can provide 
a safe haven for terrorists, produce drugs, contribute to international crime, practice 
piracy, be involved in irregular warfare (sometimes by invitation from other state actors), 
deal in arms smuggling and many other activities that qualify as the hybrid threat concept 
                                                 
24 Aaronson et al., “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” 115. 
25 Robert Cooper “The Post-modern State and the World Order,” Demos, (2000): 15-16 accessed on 07/12/2012 
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/postmodernstate.pdf?1240939425  
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when mixed together and applied in the manner that allows the executioner to get the 
biggest political or economic profit possible.26 What concerns NATO then, as one can 
see clearly, is dealing with the threats created by failed states over the last decade.  
War in Afghanistan, fighting piracy at the costs of Somalia, permanent 
involvement in crisis management related to frozen conflicts between states in Central 
and Eastern Europe are all on NATO’s daily agenda. The last NATO 2012 Chicago 
Summit is the best proof of this. The most important question on Summit’s agenda was 
related to war in Afghanistan and how to leave this country without opening Pandora’s 
box but instead provide the state with minimal capability of government and political 
authority that will not collapse within days after last NATO soldier leaves the country.27 
One might, of course, argue that these issues have nothing to do with hybrid threats or 
hybrid warfare and that similar threats and wars, such as NATO’s current dealings in 
Afghanistan or Somalia, have existed for ages. At the same time, one should not doubt 
that if not solved properly, each of these crises that are now on NATO’s political and 
strategic agenda might turn into a catastrophic disaster similar to that of September 11, 
2001. And despite all the security measures countries have taken during the last decade, 
no doubt the opportunity of failed state representative to fly another renegade aircraft or 
attack critical infrastructure object is more possible now than it was in last decades of 
twentieth century. 
b. Raising Powers as Hybrid Threat Actors 
Another group that represents both hybrid threat and state actors are states 
whose political, economic, and partially military power has increased during the last 
decade to the extent that these states have declared ambitions for greater domination in 
international relations. Rising global powers such as China or India already have sent 
                                                 
26 Martin van Creveld “Afghanistan and Iraq: An Interim Assessment,” in Paul Brister et al. eds. Hybrid Warfare 
and Transnational Threats: Perspectives for an Era of Persistent Conflict, 190–197 see also Troy Thomas “Plucking 
the Bird: Three Rounds of Coercive Diplomacy in Somalia, 1992–1995,” 285-294, Kristen Casey “Diasporas and 
Hybrid Warfare: The Case of the Somali Diaspora,” 295–312 in Paul Brister et al. eds. Hybrid Warfare and 
Transnational Threats: Perspectives for an Era of Persistent Conflict. 
27 NATO Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan Issued by the Heads of State and Government of 
Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force accessed at 08/23/2012 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-F5F8ED16-968D8E58/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm? 
 16 
signals that they would like to see changes in the global order and that they are not going 
to be the part of NATO, which must be ready to deal with these powers for better or 
worse.28 Of course, rising global powers from one side and NATO’s global footprint and 
willingness to cooperate with these powers on the other does not mean threats coming 
from all sides but also means global partnership and cooperation.29 However, the means 
some of these powers are using and the ways they have chosen to reach their global 
influence threaten certain regions and nation states. Here one can find a variety of 
evidences that speak to the presence of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. For example: 
[t]he Iranians used what conventional naval forces they had, including 
relatively modern conventional frigates, anti-ship cruise missiles, and 
swarming boats, mines, and rockets. Iranian naval developments over the 
last decade appear to make a strong case that the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps is extending and formalizing hybrid concepts as their central 
doctrine. This doctrine applies a hybrid combination of conventional and 
irregular tactics and weapons to posit a significant anti-access threat to 
both military and commercial shipping.30 
Similarly one may find Chinese activities characteristic of hybrid warfare 
considering the massive capability China’s military is building in order to fight in cyber 
space, their increased activity in outer space as well as their building up of conventional 
capabilities that violate the safe use of global commons such as waters of high seas (anti-
ship missiles and modern maritime surveillance and targeting systems).31  
One might ask whether these are issues that NATO should address or are 
these problems for the United States, which may feel challenged by rising powers in the 
geostrategic area that used to be under the unique control of the U.S. Navy and Air Force 
for decades? In this regard it is worth remembering that even a minor negative change in 
one of the dimensions of the global commons, whether sea or air space, could create a 
butterfly effect on the whole international society and on NATO as an organic part of this 
                                                 
28 Brezinski “An Agenda for NATO: Toward a Global Security Web,” 6. 
29 Goldgeier, “The Future of NATO,” 8. 
30 Frank Hoffman “The Hybrid Character of Modern Conflict,” in Paul Brister et al. Hybrid Warfare and 
Transnational Threats, 44. 
31 Jeffrey Becker “Strategic Trends and Drivers,” 30-33, Thomas Bowditch “Sea Control,” 152–153 in Scott 
Jasper ed. Securing Freedom in the Global Commons, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
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society. Moreover, for more than a decade already, NATO has been moving its 
international security and global posture together rather than remaining strictly a regional 
collective defense organization defending the Euro-Atlantic area from conventional and 
nuclear threats. Therefore, if not today then tomorrow, China’s force projection in the 
South China Sea against Vietnam and Philippines, or Iran’s threats to ensure a naval 
blockade of oil cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz, might become an issue for the 
Alliance, which already has several years of experience in conducting out-of-area crisis 
management operations. Rising world powers have proved to be successful in projecting 
hybrid threats and exercising different modes of warfare except in a classical 
conventional manner because they realize that they are years behind Western military 
superiority. Nevertheless, this success has not stopped these powers from seeking other 
ways to undermine Western status in the global arena and hybrid warfare is among such 
ways. 
c. State Actors that Use Hybrid Threats in Order to Regain Their 
Power Status 
The third category of state actors that use hybrid threats to realize policies 
are states whose power positions on the international or regional level have been 
weakened. Understanding their status in international relations as well as having certain 
authority and responsibility for sustaining international order and stability, these states 
cannot afford to rebuild their power positions in the old-fashioned way through blood and 
iron. For that purpose these states are forced to find other ways to regain their power 
positions. The most visible example in speaking about such states using hybrid warfare 
methods is Russia, which by no means is one of NATO’s strategic concerns. Russia has 
successfully penetrated its neighboring countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Special 
attention has been paid to new NATO member and partner countries that have 
experienced disruptions of gas supplies, trade embargoes, cyber-attacks and political 
rhetoric.32  
                                                 
32 Ronald Asmus, Stefan Czmur, Chris Donnelly, Aivis Ronis, Tomas Valasek, Klaus Witman “NATO, New 
Allies and Reassurance,” Centre for European Reform, (May, 2010): 2. 
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These examples show that even NATO membership does not deter Russia 
from continuing the use of intimidation toward NATO newcomers. NATO must be ready 
to provide visible assurances to its Central and Eastern European members and get 
involved in non-Article 5 crisis management operations thus giving a response to hybrid 
threats and avoiding possible conflict escalation up to the scale of Article 5 operations. 
One should not doubt that Russia, and those who are sympathetic to its methods of 
exposing hybrid threat, will continue examining the weaknesses in NATO’s “armor” 
because it considers Central and Eastern Europe as a zone of influence and a security 
buffer zone.33 Yet, states such as Russia, China, Iran or Afghanistan are not the only 
actors that expose hybrid threats, as hybrid conflicts are a way for non-state actors to 
fight against more powerful state actors and organizations in order to reach their political 
and strategic aims. 
2. Non-state Actors: Creators of Hybrid Warfare  
A number of non-state actors and organizations are permanently at war with 
NATO or its separate member states. These include terrorist groups, religious 
fundamentalists, organized crime organizations as well as paramilitary organizations that 
support certain political power and have taken opposition to NATO and the Western 
world’s values in general. These groups operate individually or in cooperation with state 
actors with whom they share political, religious, social or purely economic motives that 
are strong enough to motivate action through the use of violence.  
Usually non-state actors are conventionally weaker than state actors or collective 
defense organizations like NATO. Hybrid warfare is their method and rules of 
engagement allowing them to challenge more superior state actors. For non-state actors 
hybrid conflict opens a window of opportunity of doing the greatest possible harm to 
opponents and their societies while at the same time leaving a probability to remain 
anonymous thus receiving less punishment or escaping punishment all together.34 
                                                 
33Ronald Asmus et al. “NATO, New Allies and Reassurance,” 2; See also Maria Mälksoo “NATO’s New 
Strategic Concept: What is at Stake for Estonia?” International Centre for Defense Studies, (November, 2008): 4 
34 Aaronson et al., “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” 115. 
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E. HYPOTHESES AND PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED  
Despite having sound existing strategic objectives, NATO has not yet fully 
adapted its policy and strategic planning to prevent hybrid threats and engage in hybrid 
conflict for three reasons. First, internally, the Alliance has developed a complex 
decision-making process that may not always translate policy into military or any other 
kind of enforcement action before the threats have affected the Alliance. Second, 
externally, potential hybrid-threat actors tend to come from the same quarters that 
formally have been identified as Alliance’s partners. Since the end of the Cold War, 
NATO has established partnerships with such major powers as Russia, China, Pakistan, 
and others but this relationship not always has been resulted in common action and 
understanding about strategic goals and policies NATO has declared to follow.35 Their 
modus operandi lies within strategies that violate international laws, undermine the safety 
of global commons, and favor the application of all kinds of lethal and non-lethal means 
including use of the cyberspace, outer space, critical civilian infrastructure, economic 
sanctions, political propaganda, military means, and terrorism to affect the security and 
the policies of the Allied populations and their governments. Third, theoretically, the 
hybrid threat and hybrid conflict concept requires more aggressive and direct application 
of policy, which is hard to realize within the consensus decision-making process and 
divergent state security cultures in NATO.  
Hybrid threats might be created both by non-state and state actors who are 
politically motivated to undermine NATO and its members in order to strengthen their 
own power positions. Existing evidence, however, shows that every tactical threat of the 
                                                 
35 NATO has partnership with Russia; there is even NATO-Russia Council. NATO has relationship with China; 
successfully cooperating in such areas as anti-piracy operations at costs of Somalia. NATO has also partnership with 
Pakistan; this country participates in NATO Summits and is NATO’s partner in fighting against Taliban and Al Qaeda. 
Yet, all of these 'partners' have their black side. Russians stand behind cyber attacks against NATO countries, generate 
artificial economic sanctions and create disruptions of energy supplies in the time of year where major consumers are 
freezing to death. China has built its secret cyber army and violates global commons making headache for the U.S. 
(which automatically means headache for NATO, too). Pakistan is friend and partner while NATO is using supply 
route through this country and pays enormous money for that. When it comes about real involvement in setting peace in 
Afghanistan then Pakistani ISI and army generals turned out to be helping Taliban not NATO (the hunt of Bin Laden is 
the most screaming example). These are perfect hybrid threat actors who are actually neither foes, nor friends, neither 
partners nor enemies. 
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hybrid nature that has been directed to the areas of NATO interest has been an outcome 
of the political and strategic level interactions between the Alliance and the contestant.36  
Hybrid threats also represent the situation to NATO once terrorism represented 
before attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. There were speculations 
about possible large-scale deadly terrorist attacks on the North-Atlantic territory but no 
clear vision against which NATO member state or states would be the target and how 
exactly the attack would be executed. Similarly, the question is about the hybrid threats. 
There is no clear information within NATO how and when it will experience attack of 
hybrid threat actor using hybrid modes of threats although NATO’s New Strategic 
Concept and member state national security strategies recognize existence of 
unconventional threats, threats to civilian populations, critical infrastructure, and state 
political and economic stability that provide high added value to creation of hybrid 
threats and emergence of hybrid conflict. 
Facing a wide range of threats that might be exercised by an unknown adversary 
through sophisticated offensive strategies results in the hard task for NATO. Therefore, 
the Alliance is being challenged to establish visible policy, robust strategy, and adapted 
military and civilian capabilities in order to give answer to such kinds of threats utilized 
in the new form of conflict/war. 
Within the hybrid conflict, potential adversaries utilize global commons, which 
means greater NATO involvement in such dimensions as space, cyberspace, as well as 
maritime and air space dimensions. Basically, the defense of these dimensions has been 
addressed primarily by separate NATO nations (notably the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany). Yet the growing competition and emergence of new 
threats that derive from these dimensions leave direct impact on whole NATO and 
                                                 
36 The best example one may find in Russia’s actions against Estonia in 2007 when politically motivated riots and 
cyber attacks were executed after Estonia’s decision to remove relict statue of the Soviet occupation from the city 
center; other example is Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008 as a response to political recognition of Kosovo as well as 
NATO’s decision about not providing Georgia with Membership Action Plan in NATO Bucharest Summit, 2008 see 
Ronald Asmus A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West, (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 54-89; James M. Goldgeier “The Future of NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council Special Report No. 51, (February, 2010): 7; Maria 
Mälksoo “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: What is at Stake for Estonia?” International Centre for Defense Studies, 
(November 2008): 4. 
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questions its capability of involving and proving itself as valuable guarantor while a 
potential opponent has already launched hybrid war against the Alliance.  
F. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
NATO still has the potential to fight hybrid conflicts if the Alliance is able to 
create a political process that can be transformed into political and military action.  
According to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, this process should be 
based on so-called “Smart Defense” capabilities.37 Altogether, NATO nations possess 
significant political power, strategic maturity, and enough human and technical resources 
to fight hybrid threats and hybrid conflicts effectively at all levels. The problem, 
however, is in realizing sound policy and implementing strategic objectives in a 
reasonable and timely manner. The permanent internal discussion among members 
concerning burden-sharing and burden-shifting policies as well as different national and 
international political agendas of NATO members create the greatest danger to the 
Alliance in case it has to engage in hybrid conflict where cyber war and terrorist attacks 
on civilian populations mixed with conventional and irregular warfare against military 
forces would be launched rapidly in timely manner with short preparation phase.  
Despite the emerging hybrid threats and the growing demand for civilian 
capabilities, NATO must sustain its existing capabilities to fight conventional conflicts 
and defend allied nations against nuclear attacks. Potential adversaries would achieve 
their political goal if NATO overemphasized its investment in fighting against irregular 
and unconventional threats at the same time weakening the ability and decreasing 
resources necessary to fight conventional conflicts. NATO has to improve its defense 
capabilities through transforming hybrid threats into advantages thus increasing the 
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II. THE HISTORY OF WAR THEORY AND ITS 
CONTRIBUTION TO HYBRID CONFLICT/WAR CONCEPT 
NATO symbolizes a durable security and collective defense organization that has 
fulfilled its varying role for more than sixty years. This success results from NATO’s 
ability to transform and create defense forces and institutions that have protected allied 
nations from nearly all the kinds of threats that the contemporary world has experienced. 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty provides unique security guarantees:  
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall 
be considered an attack against them all and if such an armed attack 
occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective 
self-defence will assist the Party or Parties individually and in concert 
with the other Parties, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.38  
However, hybrid threats do not necessarily take the form of an armed attack–
which, in turn, may delay or even preclude NATO’s resort to the mechanism of collective 
defense described in the Article 5. While the emergence of hybrid threats does not 
undermine the political necessity and the institutional genius of the trans-Atlantic security 
and collective defense system itself, it does call into serious question the Alliance’s 
effectiveness in dealing with contemporary threats that simultaneously display 
conventional and unconventional aspects.  
Understanding what kind of the political and strategic measures NATO must 
apply—in the complex geopolitical environment where this alliance of major Western 
world powers must seek a balance among the rising powers in Asia, the Middle East, and 
the Russian Federation—will help to define the most appropriate NATO response to 
modern threats including those of hybrid nature. At the same time, NATO’s response to 
hybrid threats must account for the age-old requirement of organizing political consensus 
and providing defense for twenty-eight nation states. Thus, one must look at NATO’s 
past experience and attempts to resolve political instability both within its territory and 
                                                 
38 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April, 1949 accessed on 07/27/2012 at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm   
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beyond its borders. Finally, understanding the gaps in NATO capabilities will give allied 
nations a reasonable basis for more precise allocations for defense expenditure, a critical 
issue for all NATO member states being more or less affected by the financial crisis.  
A. A LOOK TO THE LITERATURE 
The literature that has contributed to the understanding of the topic of hybrid 
threats and hybrid wars is organized into three categories.  
The first category shows that hybrid threats and hybrid war itself are not creation 
of the twenty-first century but have historic background. This category contributes to the 
universal understanding of the concept of war, its different dimensions, and its interaction 
with policy and strategy by explaining similarities that hybrid war has with other types of 
war. The second category proves that there is already separate field dedicated to study of 
the hybrid war. This category focuses on the direct explanations of the hybrid threat and 
hybrid conflict [war] concepts, explaining their specifics and differences from the classic 
forms of war. The third category shows that NATO itself has paid attention to the issue 
and done research by itself. It represents NATO by explaining NATO policy, its strategic 
objectives, and its effort in formulating the Alliance’s ability to defend from hybrid 
threats. 
B. WAR—PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE, AND HYBRID 
There are elements of war theory that has been defined by such war philosophers 
as Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu that do not change whether one speaks about the 
wars of Napoleonic times or thirty-two day war between Hezbollah and Israeli Defense 
Forces in 2006. There is always a will of warring sides to find the weakest spot in 
enemy’s armor to penetrate it right in that spot to achieve the quick victory.39 There is 
always a personality that can impact the outcome of the war depending upon its 
knowledge, character, genius and courage.40 And there is also the unpredictability, 
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friction, and uncertainty that makes war so savage and non-controllable.41 One can find 
any war, armed conflict, or minor warfare in the history of the humanity where these 
elements have not been present. Wars that are ongoing in the Twenty-first century and 
that will follow are not exclusion nor hybrid wars/conflicts are different. That makes their 
patterns recognizable when analyzed by the war theorists. 
The central element in Carl von Clausewitz’s war philosophy is the argument that 
“war is merely the continuation of policy by another means.”42 Clausewitz contributes to 
the universal understanding of any kind of war explaining that all wars are acts of policy 
and their only difference is in the level of the politicization, production of friction, the 
gamble element and uncertainty.43 He has also defined that elements of strategy come 
from different domains including: moral, physical, mathematical, geographical and 
statistical that cover both the conventional and non-conventional environments that are so 
characteristic when one thinks of hybrid war.44 Clausewitz discovers the unpredictable 
nature of war where this phenomenon has proven to have the ability to mutate and bring 
numerous surprises to the perpetrator. Better than any other war philosopher, Clausewitz 
has described the nature of war as “a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial 
violence, hatred, and enmity or passion, chance and opportunity.”45 Clausewitz’s 
contribution to the understanding of the universal nature of war is the fundamental 
concept that characterizes hybrid war and, with high probability, will do so with other 
future concepts of war as well. 
Another war philosopher, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, defines the art of war 
and its linkage to politics as being one of the most important components of war.46 
Jomini emphasizes the role of politics as the act of statesmanship, diplomacy, and 
strategy that is the critical part of war defining objectives and the overall reason why 
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wars start and why they end favoring one party or another with the victory.47 Jomini’s 
contribution to the explanations of the contemporary concept of hybrid wars is sound.  He 
has also paid attention to explaining the importance of mixed operations in a pure 
military and conventional battle environment, where the combination of military 
formations that differ in tasks, mission, size and appropriateness project the biggest 
danger to the enemy than only one static and predictable detachment.48 With this 
explanation, Jomini has come close to the basic element of the hybrid war concept in 
which a variety of means projects the biggest threat, uncertainty and a fog of war to those 
whom have been addressed. 
Eastern war philosopher Sun Tzu has stated “warfare is the way of deception” and 
the main task of every strategy is to figure out enemy’s weaknesses and attack them with 
the best means available.49 He describes the very nature of war as one that is permanently 
seeking for solutions about the best applications to realize the goal of the warring party. 
By no means the concept of hybrid war fits in this description. 
Colin Gray in his book Modern Strategy stated “modern strategy is about the 
theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of organized force for political 
purposes.”50 Gray concludes wars are multidimensional establishments that are not built 
on strategies based only on the amount of soldiers and weapons. Instead, wars include 
such dimensions as culture, people, politics, society, ethics, information, intelligence and 
many more segments that are significant to the projection of hybrid threats and 
subsequent hybrid conflicts.51 Important to NATO capabilities, in order to withstand 
hybrid threats, are Gray’s thoughts about the character of strategy where: 
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One can dissect the character and working of strategy with regard to 
weapons or technologies (the strategic consequences of armored forces, or 
nuclear weapons, or computers), or with a focus upon different levels of 
violence or character of wars (general war, limited war, irregular conflict 
and terrorism).52 
Gray also contributes to Clausewitzian thought stating that in a contemporary 
world the most prudent and rational defense planner lives in an environment of 
uncertainty, where frictions may impact the best war machine that have political and 
defense planning arrangements (such as NATO).53 Furthermore, closer to the 
explanations related to hybrid wars, Gray also pays attention to small wars, terrorism, 
irregular conflicts and guerilla warfare considering these forms of warfare as savage 
violence that “challenges the strategic theorist with a seductive diversity.”54 In this 
regard, one may find that these forms of war have a very challenging nature and thus 
make every strategy uncertain and vulnerable regarding its success or failure. 
Finally, Gray concludes that despite the fact that irregular warfare, guerillas and 
terrorists are “as old as the strategic history” they will continue to grow in numbers and 
develop in different forms because there are growing numbers of belligerents where one 
party is significantly weaker in terms of strategic military superiority. Thus, the weakest 
are being forced to find other ways to attain political goals. Exploration of terrorism, 
guerilla warfare and asymmetric solutions (hybrid threats) is the only way to survive and; 
the increase of wars in different dimensions is inescapable because of the “alleged 
decline in the authority of the state under the pressures of globalization.”55  
Gordon Craig speaks of strategy and war-making by initiating a discussion about 
the relationship between civilian policy makers and military strategists, asking who are 
more responsible for threat emergence, threat prevention as well as how to withstand 
threats. Craig’s argument that “the nature of the political system, the efficiency and 
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prestige of the military establishment, and the character and personality of the political 
leader” may be considered as the explanation and simultaneously the solution not only 
considering the outcome of two world wars in twentieth century but also many diverse 
conflicts on a smaller scale that have occurred in the first decade of the tenty-first 
century.56  
One may conclude that the very nature of war, and its different forms, is prone to 
hybridize if this is necessary for achieving political goals. Therefore, all wars are equal in 
the framework of producing uncertainty, exposure to hatred and unmarked windows of 
opportunity that may be used or missed. Subsequently, strategists and political authorities 
face the same challenges in proposing the right solutions and approaches to achieve 
political objectives by using instruments of force, whether through regular conventional 
forms executed between two armies like those of the Napoleonic era or the Israeli and 
Hezbollah war in 2006. Nevertheless, the classic approach only partly can help 
contemporary NATO defense planner to understand the hybrid war. All above-mentioned 
authors grant certain order when speaking about the nature of war, the conduct of war, 
and the modes of warfare whether that was conventional or unconventional. The dilemma 
of the hybrid war lies in the issue that this type of war has not yet been defined by its 
specific order but hybrid threat actor chooses the way, how the war should be launched 
adapting and interpreting means and ways as dictated by the necessity. One should agree 
that the character of the hybrid war is the same as other forms of war but the ways and 
methods differ what requires to look at those experts that have been analyzed the 
concepts of the hybrid war, hybrid threats, and hybrid conflict through the edge of pro 
and contra.  
C. THEORY OF HYBRID WAR: A HARD TIME FOR THE BLUR 
CONCEPT? 
Those who consider hybrid war and hybrid threats as a valid self-sustaining 
theoretical concept with the real ambitions to impact the way state and non-state actors 
fight wars in the Twenty-first century have been left under the fire of wide criticism that 
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this concept is blur representation of the tactical level issues, and does not differ from any 
other previously existing theories describing asymmetric and irregular warfare. Yet, none 
of those critiques predicted war that would be fought using plane attacks against NATO 
city skyscrapers, improvised explosive devices, decade long wars out of NATO 
territories, and permanent violence in the cyberspace. Criticizers of hybrid war concept 
also have not predicted that rogue state and non-state actors continue to expose danger 
against NATO populations deep inside in North-Atlantic territory by spreading fear both 
in virtual and real space blowing up subway trains, hacking public and private websites, 
and permanently keeping alive the narrative that people in NATO states cannot feel safe 
and sooner or later they will be again penetrated similarly like that happened in the New 
York, London, and Madrid. Therefore, one should take into account that beyond the 
“straw-man” argument it is important to look at expert thoughts about the hybrid war 
because not critique but better theoretical understanding of these concepts is the key of 
NATO to protect against hybrid threats and fight hybrid wars successfully.  
Considering specific theories on hybrid war, hybrid conflict and hybrid threats, 
Frank Hoffman is the most well-known author to directly address questions about the 
concept of hybrid wars as well as the foundation of hybrid threats. Hoffman describes 
concepts of hybrid conflict and hybrid threats in well understandable manner showing the 
connections of this concept with the previously known forms of war. On the basis of the 
universal concepts that have described the characteristics of wars known for centuries, 
Hoffman connects these classic definitions together with the explanation of the 
contemporary political and strategic environment where “hybrid wars blend the lethality 
of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.”57 
According to Hoffman, hybrid wars are lessons learned from the best experiences of 
warfare in previous centuries with the enhancement of contemporary advantages in 
political processes, global interdependence, and the victorious march of technologies that 
may be easily transformed into weapons helping to achieve political goals both by state 
and non-state actors: 
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Hybrid wars can be conducted both by states and a variety of non-state 
actors. Hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare 
including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, 
terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal 
disorder.58 
Apart from a dedication to achieving political goals on the strategic level, by 
combining different means and battle space domains, Hoffman argues that in the hybrid 
war concept one may find similarity with the “compound war” concept presented by 
Thomas Huber.59 In compound wars, regular and irregular forces are under a unified 
command and are being used for one strategic purpose—to exhaust the conventional 
adversary in order to support the main mission of the regular force.60 This concept seems 
similar to hybrid wars but with an additional component of different types of threats that 
are of a non-conventional nature. Therefore, Hoffman has come to conclusion that: 
compound war is more frequent type, and that hybrid threats are simply a 
subcomponent of compound war in which the degree of coordination and 
fusion occurs at lower levels. It also appears that the greater degree, the 
hybrid version is increasing in frequency.61 
This argument is true when one strictly speaks about hybrid warfare as an action 
in the real battlefield. However, hybrid threats obtain strategic importance when there is 
not really existing compound war but permanent civilized life that has been interrupted 
with projection of threats against civilian targets and civilian population more than 
against military and their facilities.  
In another article Hoffman argues, “instead of separate challengers with 
fundamentally different approaches (conventional, irregular, or terrorist), one can expect 
to face competitors who will employ all forms of war and tactics perhaps, 
simultaneously.”62 Hoffman warns that this might be of the highest importance for 
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organizations like NATO—that the biggest challenge regarding the prevention of hybrid 
threats will come not from “a state that selects one approach, but from states and groups 
that select from the whole menu of tactics, technologies and blend them in innovative 
ways to meet their own strategic culture, geography, and aims.”63 This notification 
reflects the concerns addressed in the NATO New Strategic Concept what proves the 
reality of the battlefield where NATO might be forced to engage. NATO already 
experiences a bulk of threats both in cyberspace, against critical infrastructure within 
NATO states, against its troops stationed in Afghanistan, and against global commons in 
space or international waters close to the costs of Somalia. All of these dangers happens 
at the same time and also are tended to interact between each other.  
Nevertheless, despite predictions about hybrid threat interconnectivity with 
different combinations of warfare, Hoffman reminds the proponents of military capability 
transformation that hybrid threats and the concept of hybrid warfare has neither made 
conventional warfare doctrine nor the military as an institution itself an obsolete 
formation but instead, has changed the points of gravity in the doctrine of modern war-
fighting.64 In this regard, one must consider as a warning to NATO political authorities, 
defense strategists, and planners that executioners of the hybrid war may turn the vector 
of war towards a classic military conflict if they see the opportunity to defeat the 
contestant and achieve the political objective of war in this most known and classic way. 
NATO’s strength is in its military capability that cannot be transformed radically but 
adapted to the new condition still keeping its core functions—collective defense against 
armed attack. 
Dr. Russell Glenn, in his article “Thoughts on ‘Hybrid’ Conflict” pays attention to 
the terms describing hybrid conflict and their applicability to the contemporary security 
challenges and the broader question asking whether “the hybrid concept is sufficiently 
original to merit addition to military intellectual discourse and—ultimately—armed 
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forces doctrine as a separate form of warfare.”65 In the first question Glenn discusses the 
use of “hybrid” as an adjective for “war,” “conflict,” “warfare,” and “threat” where he 
finds that some of the terms are applicable to all levels of war but others are directed 
towards separate tactical, operational and strategic levels.66 Glenn considers that the 
confusion in the terminology brings defense planners and other officials to mistaken 
conclusions in thinking about tactical level concepts as something of strategic 
importance. He concludes that hybrid concept is not something unique at strategic and 
operational levels but finds its difference at tactical level.67  
This argument is partly correct in the context of real examples of hybrid conflicts 
and what impact they left on one or another conflicting party. Cyber-attacks against 
Estonia in 2007 left long-term strategic and political impact in Estonian and Russian 
relationship. War in Georgia in 2008 literary decapitated Georgian attempts to join 
NATO as full-fledged member in nearest timely perspective. Finally, the 2012 language 
referendum in Latvia, another NATO member country, almost concluded in losing one of 
Latvian nation’s sovereign rights—speaking in Latvian as the only official language 
which is the question of the live and death for the two millions big population. Glenn 
might argue that there is nothing to do with the hybrid conflict at all. Yet, it is hard to 
argue against these examples by saying that they all have not been part of greater 
strategic rivalry where outcome could be different in the case of successful outcome.  
By analyzing Hezbollah’s performance in the war with Israel in 2006, Glenn has 
come to the conclusion that the concept of hybrid war is applicable to the definition of 
“comprehensive approach,” which is popular in the defense and international 
establishments of the Western world.68 Considering many similarities between the hybrid 
war concept and other forms of war on strategic and operational levels, Glenn concludes 
that only hybrid war tactics are at a level which is different from previously known forms 
                                                 
65 Dr. Russell W. Glenn “Thoughts on Hybrid Conflict,” Small Wars Journal (March 2, 2009): 3. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thoughts-on-hybrid-conflict, accessed on 02/28/2012 
66 Ibid., 3. 
67 Ibid., 6. 
68 Ibid., 5. 
 33 
of fighting and therefore the whole concept is not applicable to the separate doctrine of 
war but merely plays a subordinate role.69 It is hard to see Hezbollah’s action as 
comprehensive approach in terms of the Western and NATO understanding. Hezbollah’s 
approach was built for the necessity to leave greater negative impact on Israeli Defense 
Forces and civilian society by using combination of military, technologies and media 
narrative. All of that was used to spread more fear and violence in Israel and create 
wrong persuasion in the international society. NATO’s understanding of comprehensive 
approach states that for effective crisis management and security building there is 
necessary to adopt comprehensive approach that includes use of political, military, and 
civilian instruments that are interconnected between each other.70 There is great 
difference between comprehensive approach that is used to spread violence and one that 
is used for peace and security building. Indeed, both of them have the same strategic 
aim—to implement policy and achieve political goals. Therefore, both Hezbollah’s 
comprehensive approach/hybrid war against Israel and NATO’s comprehensive 
approaches are strategic level dimensions not ones of tactical meaning. 
David Sadowski and Jeff Becker argue that the problem in understanding hybrid 
threats is that significant attention has been paid to means by which a potential adversary 
would fight without understanding the ways in which an adversary will transform 
strategy and warfare into expected political objectives.71 Similarly to Glenn, Sadowski 
and Becker consider hybrid threat and hybrid war as not a unique concept but as the 
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war.72 They conclude that the ability to balance material and cognitive elements defines 
future just as the adaptability of individuals and organizations will define their success or 
vulnerability in facing hybrid threats.73  
By no means is hybrid war a unique concept, as the previous section proved. 
Hybrid threats and hybrid war, however, are phenomena that pay attention to the uses and 
advantages of the twenty-first century so effectively that every single piece of 
technology, infrastructure object, and Internet website now has dual-use capability. One 
may use them as an instrument for peaceful and simply economic reasons or they might 
be used to spread the violence. Such hybrid threat actors as a Hezbollah fighter or hacker 
from China taught the world about that. 
Erin Simpson represents experts who do not consider hybrid war as a new and 
unknown concept, stating that hybrid wars are “neither new nor identical to ideal types of 
conflict preferred by states like the U.S.”74 However, she emphasizes the concern that 
these wars are “increasing in frequency and understanding them will continue to be a key 
national security concern.”75 The main problem Simpson considers is the concentration 
on actors and their tactics while executing hybrid wars instead of analyzing war aims and 
strategy, which would be far more important in understanding hybrid war and the best 
ways to fight it.76  
Brian Fleming writes: 
The contemporary hybrid threat actor is a practitioner of unrestricted 
operational art that aptly combines regular and irregular capabilities 
simultaneously into a unified operational force to achieve strategic effects. 
Historically, threat actors that combine types of warfare to achieve their 
end-states have always existed in some form or fashion. Nation-state 
actors have habitually used irregular capabilities to set conditions for 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 2, 10. 
73 Ibid., 10. 
74 Erin Simpson, "Thinking about Modern Conflict: Hybrid Wars, Strategy, and War Aims," Paper Presented at the 
Annual Meeting of The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, (April 7, 2005): 
22. 
75 Ibid., 22. 
76 Ibid., 22–23. 
 35 
conventional forces. However, the hybrid threat organization can also 
integrate its capabilities to an even greater extent where conventional and 
irregular forces form a composite operational force to set conditions and 
achieve strategic effects.77 
Fleming’s description of hybrid threat actors is NATO’s future battlefield. It is 
hard to believe that upcoming decades NATO will experience classical military threats 
from large conventional forces. Instead, NATO’s strategic documents show that allied 
defense planners are concerned about the actors that are professionally and morally 
capable and self-legitimized to use any means and any variations to weaken the strongest 
military alliance in the world.  
Fleming concludes that “hybrid threat is a valid threat concept for operational and 
strategic planning that establishes the macrocosm of future threat organization 
representing the continuity from the past, yet a contextual response to contemporary 
overmatch.”78 This observation provides the argument that hybrid threats and hybrid war 
is the next level of war fighting whose user has successfully adopted necessary 
knowledge of the previous wars and theories.  
D. NATO GOES HYBRID 
All these experts have considered hybrid threat and hybrid war as a phenomenon 
that has transformed because of the necessity to adapt to weaker state or non-state actors 
and their ability to engage with such militarily superior states as the U.S., or collective 
defense organizations such as NATO, in order to achieve strategic objectives through the 
application of tactical means that have proven to be usable for reaching strategic goals. In 
this regard, some authors criticize defense officials for their concentration on tactical 
level issues and for interpreting them as a question of the strategic meaning instead of 
trying to understand policy and the strategic culture of potential belligerents. They invite 
responsible authorities to concentrate on reasons why political and strategic levels lack  
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the ability to engage successfully with hybrid threat actors as well as take appropriate 
lessons learned from past state and non-state actors were successful in dealing with 
hybrid threats and hybrid wars.    
The most important document of political and strategic importance that defines 
the Alliance’s position on hybrid threats is the new NATO Strategic Concept, adopted by 
NATO heads of state and governments at the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010. This is the 
first strategic level document that has officially recognized that the security environment 
of the contemporary world contains more than conventional threats.79 Furthermore, the 
Strategic Concept encounters a variety of threats that, in combination with regular forms 
of warfare, have been considered by experts as the core of hybrid threat exposition and 
the main focus of the hybrid war. Besides recognizing terrorism threats, the Strategic 
Concept also emphasizes threats of a criminal nature, the political and social instability in 
regions outside of the Alliance’s borders, the vulnerability of cyberspace and civilian 
critical infrastructure, threats to energy security and its lack of resources, environmental 
threats, as well as the development of new high technology weapons and the use of space 
and global commons to impact NATO or its separate members.80 The Strategic Concept 
has also approved its commitment to sustain, implement and create new capabilities in 
order to defend Allies from any threats exposed to a single nation or all member states.81 
Another document that was prepared to contribute to the analysis of issues 
covered in the NATO Strategic Concept is the “Multiple Futures Project: Navigating 
Towards 2030,” prepared by the NATO Allied Command Transformation in 2009. This 
document emphasizes the necessity for NATO to adapt its capabilities, command and 
control structures, and resources to the demands of hybrid threats through various ways.  
These include increased cooperation with partners outside the Alliance, a need to 
strengthen the Alliance’s positions in the battle of narrative as well as in such domains as 
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cyberspace, space, maritime and information domains.82 Despite referencing numerous 
international experts that have provided specific area analysis and contributed to the 
preparation of the Multiple Future Project, the document reflects its nature of 
recommendations, which may leave an impact on their appropriate implementation. 
Following the Multiple Futures Project, the most visible product that is 
unclassified, and attempts to address further findings on NATO’s ability to counter 
hybrid threats, is the bilateral NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Supreme 
Allied Commander Transformation “Input to a New NATO Capstone Concept for the 
Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats.” The aim of this document is to 
“articulate the parameters of hybrid threats facing NATO and identify areas that might 
drive the development of future capabilities.”83  
The document also focuses on two issues that have been analyzed by theorists. 
First, the document acknowledges the fact that hybrid threats to NATO are not new and 
“the existing NATO policy, strategy and doctrinal framework provide valid structure for 
dealing with some of the key challenges identified as hybrid threats” by this considering 
readiness of the strategic level to prevent hybrid threats in case of the necessity.84 
Second, that NATO may experience operational and tactical challenges within its 
planning and execution process by increasing the pressure on strategic decision makers 
and their ability to provide adequate strategic communication.85  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
An appropriate and objective evaluation of the hybrid threat concept, as well as 
concepts of hybrid war and hybrid conflict has engendered robust academic debate. The 
analysis of classic war theories and separate field of theory devoted to the specifics of 
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hybrid threats, hybrid war, hybrid conflicts, and hybrid warfare shows that earlier 
conventional and unconventional forms of war have their continuity in hybrid forms 
without losing the nature and purpose of war. One may say that in hybrid war, the use of 
different types of threats and modes of warfare have reached another level of the 
effectiveness, using advantages of technologies and not ignoring any mean that can be 
good to win the adversary. Also, similarly to conventional and irregular wars, hybrid 
wars are not only tactical interactions in the battlefield. Hybrid war is another method to 
achieve strategic goal as that was using large military formations or nuclear deterrence.  
This question has not been ignored in NATO and has been reflected in the new 
NATO Strategic Concept, the most important and supreme document representing the 
Alliance’s policy and strategy. Yet a question remains regarding NATO’s real-time 
policy and strategic approach when dealing with threats of a hybrid nature and its ability 











III. NATO AND HISTORY OF THREATS: ISSUE OF EXTERNAL 
AND INTERNAL CHALLENGES 
Despite NATO’s varied experience over six-plus decades of nearly constant 
transformation and change, the threats that have confronted the Alliance continue to fall 
into two broad categories, according to Phillip Cuccia from the U.S. Army War College: 
1) External threats—nations or collection of nations that threaten war or at 
least ill will towards NATO nations. Additionally, that can be instability 
of non-member state that threatens NATO directly (Afghanistan) or 
indirectly (Kosovo). 
2) Internal threats—come from an event, political decision, or series of 
these, which threatens the integrity of Alliance.86  
Today, Cuccia argues, the biggest threat to NATO is the internal threat of the 
absence of consensus over what the perceived external threat to NATO is.87  
Despite common values and the convergent fundamental elements of strategic 
culture and policies, NATO members have their own political agendas that are dictated 
by domestic political requirements. Therefore, the several Allies have always had 
different threat perceptions based on their historic experiences, political considerations, 
military might, and economic stability. These specifics, in turn, influence their 
interactions on the political and strategic level and encourage burden-sharing 
and -shifting policies. NATO’s success hinges on the interaction of external 
circumstances, internal decision-making, and personalities standing behind the decisions 
that have to be taken in order to ensure NATO’s adaptation to the permanent changes in 
threat universe.  
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While this approach might seem to invite gridlock, if not stasis, in the event, 
NATO has developed political climate that seeks consensus for careful political decisions 
on a daily basis. According to Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant to NATO Secretary General 
for Emerging Security Challenges: 
In each decade of NATO’s existence, an external or internal crisis 
(ultimately, they tend to be one and the same) has placed it at a turning 
point—and after a period of drift and uncertainty, and of looking for 
cheap, quick-fix solutions to its problems, its leaders have had to decide 
whether to renew or re-resource it or allow it to drift into obsolescence.88 
This cyclical dynamic applies to NATO’s response to hybrid threats, as well.  
This chapter examines NATO’s experience of change and challenges to elucidate 
the Alliance-internal dynamic of appropriating and responding to new threats and new 
circumstances. The present chapter first looks at the issues of burden-sharing and burden-
shifting as both the expression of and answer to internal divisions within the Alliance. 
The second section will analyze the origins and evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty, its 
strategy documents, and the institutions that have been created through the discontent 
between allies. The third section will analyze challenges NATO faced during the Cold 
War. Finally, the fourth section is devoted to the post-Cold War period that ended with 
the 9/11 terrorists attacks.  In the end, this analysis shows that NATO has the basic 
elements in place to adapt to the world of hybrid threats—a rugged but flexible 
framework of founding documents and concepts and a fair bit of experience managing 
change—assuming that its leaders recognize this in-built capacity. 
A. BURDEN-SHARING AND BURDEN-SHIFTING: NATO’S MODUS 
OPERANDI OR THE PERMANENCE OF INTERNAL THREATS? 
Burden-sharing and burden-shifting are the way state alliances and international 
organizations function. Therefore, amid the pressures of the budget and domestic policies  
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of democratic regimes—where commitment to trade “guns for butter” has always been of 
highest importance—NATO, a true institution of collective defense, must maintain a 
careful internal balance:   
Collective defense is not a problem that can be solved through “fair” and 
“rational” burden-sharing or an “optimal” division of labor. It is a political 
problem that must be resolved by highly motivated parties intent on 
finding a way to get their allies to do more—and no just once but again 
and again—but without pushing their disagreements to the point of 
wrecking the alliance that all members value highly.89 
The greatest danger of unbalanced burden-sharing/-shifting is that this permanent 
process might embolden a potential adversary if the internal competition of the allies is 
considered as a window of opportunity to exploit their weaknesses. Several arguments 
speak to this scenario.  
First of all, there never have been unlimited resources for providing defense 
against one threat or another. In this regard, since the beginning, NATO members have 
engaged in a bargaining process, trying to persuade one another that each member has 
separately contributed the maximum while at the same time emphasizing reasons why the 
others must do more.90 On the one hand, the bargaining and political rhetoric created the 
organizational structure of NATO—routinized procedures of planning like force goals 
and coordinated production.91 On the other hand, this situation also created a strategy of 
burden shifting, supported by a bureaucratic system and a complicated process of 
communication. This system was necessary if the allies wanted to achieve agreement on 
collective defense questions within the intensive argumentation process, explaining why 
one state or another is unable to fulfill one mission or another.92  
Consequently, the real outcomes in the creation of the NATO infrastructure, 
military headquarters or AWACS fleet took months and sometimes years of negotiations 
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until final approval was reached.93 To be sure, a long process of decision-making is 
normal practice within large international organizations, especially because political 
questions of high importance–involving several countries, millions of people, and billions 
of dollars—cannot be solved in one day. Yet, the question remains whether NATO is 
significantly losing its effectiveness and reaction capabilities through internal bargaining 
processes in the face of emerging and existing threats to the security of Allied 
populations, territories, infrastructure, and economies.94 
Second, burden-shifting is motivated by the domestic contests of NATO member 
states’ political elites trying to drum up support for the next elections. In other words, the 
political elites are more concerned with the short-term interests of their respective 
nations, which require more spending for social welfare, than they are about sending 
more money to NATO, particularly if other states seem to be skating by with lesser 
contributions.95 Of course, these politicians must preserve the balance between their 
criticism of NATO and the perceptions of their competence in collective defense and 
international policy issues; they do not want to be caught out “openly sacrificing guns to 
buy butter (or vice versa).”96 As a result, NATO and its policy are necessarily 
subordinated to member states’ interests and policies, which further complicates the 
political decision-making process within the Alliance, especially in crises. 
B. BURDEN-SHIFTING AND EXTERNAL THREATS 
During the Cold War none of the NATO member states changed their agendas or 
general understanding of what the real external threats were. As a consequence, the 
Alliance remained focused on a fairly static set of threats. The Soviet Union, with its 
nuclear and conventional force, remained the major threat and enemy for decades. 
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Whether democrat or republican, conservative, Gaullist, socialist or laborite, the Soviet 
military as well as the communist party remained the No. 1 adversary to them all.  
After the Cold War and especially after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. World 
Trade Center on September 11, 2001, however, state perceptions of the contemporary 
threat environment could be hardly defined as a unified allied action. While all members 
recognized the general need to change, the specifics of this transformation were less 
clear.  For instance, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Russian invasion in 
Georgia, did not result in a definite reaction but instead split the Alliance into several 
camps representing different political agendas. Because of divergent views on external 
threats, and possible NATO missions in preventing them, burden-sharing has turned into 
burden-shifting. For instance, one group of NATO members did not consider getting 
involved in Iraq and earlier in Afghanistan because those were treated as the U.S. wars 
not the European wars. Where the United States has been expected to take on the biggest 
share of the burden, European NATO allies present more and more caveats that have 
resulted in the inability to handle both conventional-type conflicts, such as the war in 
former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and such actions as the air operations in Libya, where 
NATO failed to perform until the U.S. decided against greater involvement.97  
The outcome is embarrassing and obvious—the U.S. covers the biggest share of 
NATO military resources, and without U.S. participation, the Alliance is not capable of 
conducting a military or crisis-management mission. Most NATO member states, due to 
their lacking resources and inability to increase their share, continue declaring caveats as 
the continuation of the burden-sharing strategy.  
C. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
TREATY AND STRATEGY DOCUMENTS 
The issue of diverse threat perceptions and burden sharing/shifting has been a 
point of friction within the Alliance since its creation and continues to be one of the 
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biggest challenges, even as it presents options for new opportunities.98 Similarly, the 
threats that NATO faces today are not really new; rather they must be considered as a 
transformation of past challenges, which makes it important to analyze the experience of 
the Alliance since its very start. 
1. Treaties before “The Treaty” 
Right after World War II, both sides of the Atlantic recognized that without U.S. 
assistance, there was no chance Western Europe could withstand Soviet conventional 
superiority in continental Europe.99 Great Britain and France had the prime policy 
purpose of securing greater U.S. involvement in European affairs in order to defend 
themselves from Soviet threats as well as to prevent German rearmament. In order to 
strengthen the relationship between the UK and France, the Treaty of Dunkirk was signed 
in March 1947 expressing the Western European commitment to provide mutual 
assistance in the case of renewed German aggression.100  
Later in the same year, another treaty to address the concerns of the Western 
hemisphere about the Soviet threat was signed in Rio and known as the Rio Pact.101 The 
central element of this treaty that had eighteen signatories including the United States and 
a number of states of Americas defined the collective defense principle where: 
 
an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be 
considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, 
each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the 
attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.102  
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Both treaties, however, represented more states’ national interests than a general 
initiative in creating a common international defense institution. The Dunkirk Treaty was 
mainly a projection of European concerns about the reemergence of German aggression. 
The Rio Pact was more a representation of American isolationism and an attempt to 
prevent Soviet threats at its close borders. Neither of them, however, was considered as a 
signal for creating a common Alliance and in fact no one expected to create an 
organization such as NATO at that time.103 Despite this, further invitation for increased 
cooperation coming from Western European leaders found support in the U.S. 
government and resulted in the approval of the Marshall Plan of funding and assistance 
for Europeans in order to recover their economies. One might argue that Marshall Plan 
was a compromise decision of the discussion in the U.S. whether Western Europe had to 
receive “a short-term economic shot in the arm or a long-term military pact.”104 
Answering to American expectations, signaling a determination for shared 
responsibility and the ability to cooperate in defense against external threats, and upon 
the invitation of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, the United Kingdom, France, 
and the Benelux countries created the Western Union, which was approved by signing the 
Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration in March 1948.105 Still, 
after signing this treaty, the states had different perceptions about the ways and means to 
avoid Soviet threat on the one hand and realize their own political interests on the other. 
For the United Kingdom, this was the first major attempt to pull the United States out of 
isolationism represented by its political elite and involve the Americans not only in 
economic support but also in military assistance; for France there was an expectation to 
receive U.S. assistance in order to regain their former grandeur and solve the issues of 
domestic politics related to the growing influence of communist movements.106 For the 
United States, this was an attempt to persuade itself that Europe could carry on alone, 
relying more on its own capabilities rather than the U.S. atomic bomb and troops on the 
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ground. However, the Soviets responded to the Brussels Treaty by generating a coup in 
Prague as well as enacting the blockade of Berlin, which was the breaking point for 
changing the U.S. Congress from supporters of isolationism to greater internationalism 
and thus preventing a repetition of historical mistakes made by the League of Nations to 
establish new international regime.107  
This development resulted in Vandenberg’s resolution and the U.S. commitment 
to provide Europe with assistance not only of an economic nature but also involvement in 
“the progressive development of regional and other collective self-defense in accordance 
with the purposes, principles and provisions of the United Nations charter.”108 Both the 
Brussels Treaty and Vandenberg resolution created the foundation of the development of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. Yet even this step did not end the future allies’ divergent views 
over issues related to the creation of collective defense but rather brought them into 
another level of internal disagreements.  
2. North Atlantic Treaty, “Organization” and the Next Level of 
International Bargain 
The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, must be considered as 
a significant first step that proved the Western world’s determination to resist a potential 
adversary as unified force.109 The ratifying of the North Atlantic Treaty was a result of 
long awaited attempts to find a way to unite Western European powers and the United 
States, which was an impossible mission of political elites for centuries.110 The creation 
of a military Alliance was considered as a “precondition for economic recovery and 
peace reflecting a deeper faith that in order to secure peace, the West had to prepare for 
war.”111 In fact, many experts of different disciplines have recognized that: 
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the single shared purpose during the East–West confrontation had the 
effect of forcing allies to make common strategy even in the face of 
sometimes diverging views. Even France stayed within the political 
framework after leaving the integrated military structure in the 1960s. In 
the face of the Soviet threat NATO was fundamental to western order.112 
Despite this statement, during the talks between the U.S. and its European 
partners about the content of the North Atlantic Treaty, several opposing views showed 
different perceptions about its content and scope. On the one hand there was George 
Kennan’s “dumbbell concept” that did not support common security entities with 
Europeans but favored separate structures, making both Europeans on the one side and 
the U.S. and Canada on the other as equally responsible parties in providing the collective 
defense of the North Atlantic area.113 Despite Kennan’s arguments, the U.S. political 
elite saw this opportunity for closer integration in Europe as step toward strengthening of 
American global power ambitions but no longer at such a large expense.114  
On the other hand, there were European countries with their own expectations of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. Great Britain wanted U.S. presence in Europe because British 
political elite clearly recognized the post-war economic and military weakness of the 
former empire.115 France, in addition, had bigger expectations that were related to its 
hopes for a renewal of the French empire’s might through the assistance of Americans 
and other European allies.116 This, of course, did not restrain a growing criticism in 
French domestic politics about the U.S. attempts to establish global dominance and 
NATO as a growing threat to French independence and status of grandeur.117 Both 
European superpowers were also concerned about the rebirth of German military power 
as well as dangerous leftist political movements within their countries.118 Subsequently, 
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the involvement of the United States was considered as the key element to solve these 
issues, at least to the extent of which post-war Western Europe was not getting worse and 
the Soviet Union was not getting strategic initiative.  
D. NATO AND COLD WAR REALITIES 
The Korean War of 1950 proved to the Western world that Soviet Union was not 
deterred by U.S. nuclear capability and had not dropped the idea of global Communist 
domination.119 In this regard, the Korean War did more for Western unity and the 
strengthening of NATO than other similar events. War in Korea stopped discussions 
within the U.S. political elite about the increase of U.S. conventional forces in Europe as 
well as decreased French concerns about Germany’s rearmament and NATO 
membership.120 The most important benefit for NATO, from the Korean war, was that it 
“helped put the ‘O’ in NATO” by the general recognition of the Allies that the North 
Atlantic Alliance had to have an organizational structure that would improve collective 
decision making capability as well as common military planning and subsequent defense 
of Allied territory.121 The political costs of the Korean War, which almost destroyed the 
United Nations, helped NATO transform from paper guarantees into real entity. In this 
regard allies agreed about the establishment of Secretary General’s position, North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) serving as a forum of Allied representatives who made decisions 
about the establishment of senior military authorities including the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe and an International staff “with the duty of integrating the forces  
 
 
from Western Europe and North America that had been assigned to NATO.”122 NATO 
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finally had its own command structure, headquarters and civilian and military 
bureaucracy serving for needs of the Alliance.123 
Finally, the Korean War created new reality for the Allies, especially in Western 
Europe, that at this time their individual interests had change to collective interests in 
order to survive. Nevertheless, this did not stop former empires from struggling in the 
periphery, thus proving the issue of collective defense as only primus inter pares. One 
may mention here attempts to create European Defense Community in order to satisfy 
American expectations about the German positions in NATO or failure of creating a 
“Directoire” in order to meet French expectations about their power positions within 
NATO.124 
1. Threats, Strategy, and National Policy 
The period of the Cold War for NATO might be described by three realities that 
created permanent threats to Alliance. First, there were external threats from the Soviet 
Union and its growing military capabilities resulting in the possession of nuclear weapons 
and overwhelming nuclear threats. Second, there were national policies of NATO 
members and sometimes-conflicting relationships among each other in conflicts on the 
periphery such as the Suez Crisis or the French withdrawal from the integrated military 
structure of NATO. Third, the combination of all these realities impacted both 
international politics as well as NATO’s strategic and conceptual posture, both generating 
different consequences in international relations (deterrence and détente) as well as 
different NATO concepts and strategies.  
2. External Threats 
Nuclear proliferation and the technical development of the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War, within the framework of the Soviet and U.S. arms race, was the primary 
and most challenging external threat NATO had to deal with. By careful analysis and 
recognition of the ups and downs in the technological development that was so 
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characteristic of the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Union had well prepared its propaganda 
machine and its deterrence policy in order to persuade Western adversaries of the fatality 
a possible nuclear war would assure to them.125 The recognition of both superpowers that 
a direct confrontation would have led to mutually assured destruction was theoretically 
helping NATO escape kinetic war fighting at a nuclear level. Still, the pressure on NATO 
political and military planners did not diminish; the situation rather produced several 
other unavoidable threats.  
First, there were indirect conflicts and the collision of U.S. and Soviet interests in 
the periphery. Wars, such as Vietnam, approved the allied interdependence of unilateral 
state decisions for involvement in armed conflicts even if NATO European allies did not 
want to associate themselves with the Vietnam War.126 Not only did this rift create 
doubts about the credibility of NATO as a political forum but it also created member 
state concerns over whether NATO could defend them if “too much or too little U.S. 
involvement would lead to war with the Soviets.”127 The escalating U.S. relationship 
with the Soviet Union only increased Western European fears about peace on European 
soil and gave reasons to consider solutions other than NATO for defense as well as 
developed sharp criticism and anti-Americanism, especially in France.128  
Second, from time-to-time indirect conflicts led to the escalation of crises and 
temporary overloads creating such confrontations as Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin and the 
Cuban missile crisis, making all attempts to solve conflicts without the use of arms 
                                                 
125 In 1987 Western analysts recognized what one should consider as normal practice throughout all Cold War 
Period that “Soviets have sought through their public diplomacy to fan Western fears over the uncontrollability of 
nuclear war. Soviet spokesmen with good access to Western media have become adroit at tailoring their statements to 
confirm the fears of Western decision makers, elites, and the public in general that any use of nuclear weapons, 
however limited, would be met by a massive Soviet response resulting in unrestrained nuclear conflict. Such campaign 
undoubtedly serves a number of Soviet policy goals, but one clear purpose has been to deter Western consideration of 
any use of nuclear weapons in the event of conflict.” Notra Trulock III “Soviet Perspectives on Limited Nuclear 
Warfare” in Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, David S. Yost ed., Swords and Shields: NATO, the USSR, and New 
Choices for Long-Range Offense and Defense (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), 54. 
126 Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, 63–64. 
127 Ibid., 63. 
128 Helmut Schmidt Defense or Retaliation: A German View, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 122; See 
also Anand Menon France, NATO and the Limits of Independence 1981–97, 10. 
 51 
inappropriate.129 These episodes among others provided evidence that the biggest issue 
was not only external threats themselves but the impact they left on allied decision-
making ability and the interrelationship, which did not help improve the commitment to 
take appropriate collective defense measures but rather to rely on national capacities and 
bilateral arrangements. 
3. National Considerations 
The Suez Crisis of 1956 evidenced that NATO was not merely a military entity 
with the aim to withstand threats from the Soviet Union and its allies but also a 
consultative body where “members of NATO were encouraged to make consultation in 
NATO an integral part of the making of national policy.”130 The Suez Crisis proved that 
unilateralism was possibly huge internal issue in NATO and, if not stopped at the right 
time by common political action, it might have threatened all NATO members or 
threatened NATO’s existence in general. Allies had to respect each other’s interests and, 
more importantly, make political consultations before an action was taken. Otherwise no 
convergence in collective defense matters would have ever been possible. Nevertheless, 
not all nations applied lessons learned, as one would expect, because their domestic 
policies and antipathy to the collective action of NATO were stronger than their fear to 
undermine NATO’s credibility again. In this regard one should have a closer look at the 
French relationship with NATO. 
French withdrawal from the integrated military command structure of NATO left 
a striking effect on the unity of the Alliance because it turned on all the concerns of the 
allies regarding NATO’s reliability, U.S. intents to protect Europe as well as unity for a 
common military action if such a necessity would have emerged.131 France had always 
been suspicious of U.S. dominance in Europe but ’demarche’ of allies in Indochina, 
Algeria and partly in the Suez fortified French persuasion that only strong unilateral 
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capacity to project force would defend France as well as sustain its empire status.132 For 
this reason France saw its own nuclear capability as an existential question.  
The creation of force de frappe was politically and conceptually an essential task 
for de Gaullist politics in order to “keep the face,” secure the nations and control U.S. 
dominance in Europe at least to some extent.133 Nevertheless, while weakening NATO’s 
military capabilities, France did not withdraw from NATO’s political structures thus 
recognizing the value of political consultations and a common decision-making 
process.134 Moreover, French withdrawal favored positions of Harmel report, which “for 
the first time gave NATO a political role in seeking security with the East through 
negotiation, confidence building, and arms control as much as through deterrence, 
military exercises, and the occasional nuclear modernization program.”135 In this regard, 
one may ask whether this happened because France considered it as a beneficial position 
with more freedom to execute foreign policy it considered the best for the state or 
because France was flirting with the allies due to a lack of support in developing 
alternative structures within NATO institutions and outside the Alliance.136 
In the case of France, domestic political issues more than in any other NATO 
country dictated policy acts towards NATO. Among them were such drivers as the 
permanent continuity of De Gaulle’s political ambitions to “wash” French embarrassment 
of two world wars and return the country among the world’s superpowers. For this 
reason, the creation of its own force de frappe was considered as a simple necessity in 
order to withstand Anglo-Saxon domination, the possible rebirth of German military 
ambitions, and Soviet aggression.137 Another long-term reason for withdrawing from 
NATO was to dictate the military industrial complex, especially, nuclear weapons and 
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armament producers who took the opportunity to increase defense expenditure on the 
basis of political determination in order to have independent and self-sufficient military 
capabilities.138 This policy also allowed France to emphasize political rhetoric about its 
world power status and military might at the expense of NATO defense whereas the 
country itself would have never been involved in a war alone with the Soviet Union 
depending merely on its own capabilities.139 Yet, the cost of autonomy was later a failure 
in proving conventional capabilities in peacekeeping operations displaying that reality 
was not exactly everything French policy reflected.140 Moreover, despite this, the allies 
always welcomed even minor signals from French political elite of a return to the 
integrated military command structure but this did not help France get approval for 
commanding officer positions within that structure.141  
The French experience in some ways helped NATO to sustain its credibility in 
front of other member nations by proving that none of the NATO countries (probably 
with the exception of the United States) would have been able to provide such high 
defense guarantees independently without the assistance of other allies. Therefore, for 
better or worse, French policy managed to make the allies more convergent and thus 
decreased internal threats of fragmentation.  
4. The Outcome: Concepts and Strategies 
The official documents of NATO are not those that contribute to the topic of 
whether external or internal threats create a great danger for NATO. However, strategic 
documents reflect the successes and failures of the Alliance in dealing with those threats 
and the subsequent capacity to organize collective defense.  
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The first NATO strategic document, “The Strategic Concept for the Defense of 
the North Atlantic Area” or DC1, called all member nations to use any available means to 
defend themselves from Soviet threats with a strong emphasis on nuclear weapon 
superiority.142 This plan emphasized “the division of labor among the Allies and the 
formulation of an integrated defense plan, as demanded by the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act passed by the U.S. Congress in October 1949.”143 
The second Strategic Concept was attempt to solve issues of lacking conventional 
forces capability in Europe that in the case of war would have to withstand the Soviet 
conventional superiority as well as dealing with the consequences of growing Soviet 
nuclear capabilities.144 For this purpose the NATO Lisbon Summit in 1952 declared 
ambitious Force Goals to deploy by 1954 altogether 96 divisions after 90 days of 
mobilization.145 The concept, however, did not work because of the Allied inability to 
fulfill those force goals due to financial restrictions and restrained defense budgets.146 As 
a result, NATO was not able to increase conventional force capabilities that left its main 
reliance on nuclear capabilities.147  
Considering the failure to fulfill the Lisbon Force Goals the third Strategic 
Concept was an outcome of the U.S. “New Look” defense policy favoring the idea of 
massive retaliation through the use of nuclear weapons, as they were conventional 
instruments.148 The reliance on the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons went into NATO 
history as a “trip-wire” concept that exploited the idea of shield and sword using all 
assets of conventional forces, tactical nuclear weapons as well as strategic nuclear 
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weapons as a final means to stop Soviet aggression.149 The concept went wrong because 
of American unwillingness to share nuclear weapons control systems with their European 
allies making Europeans, in the eyes of the Soviets, minor players for political 
bargaining, and; Soviet technologic progress, with the launch of the Sputink and the 
build-up of strategic nuclear weapons, persuaded NATO members that a massive 
retaliation is anymore in the use of NATO allies but could be targeted at cities in the 
United States and Western Europe.150  
The 1967 Strategic Concept of flexible response provided NATO with a wider 
range of options against a Soviet attack, which included the use of conventional force as 
the primary instrument, following with the use of tactical nuclear weapons and finally the 
use of strategic theater-wide nuclear weapons in cases of necessity.151 This concept, 
however, did not remove NATO’s European members’ concerns from the table regarding 
the effectiveness of the use of nuclear weapons and U.S. readiness to “change Los 
Angeles for London or Berlin” in the case of nuclear confrontation.152 These concerns, 
together with the raising of internal pressures, led to the Multilateral Force Concept that 
would have to appease Europeans through providing them with additional nuclear 
capabilities, deter the Soviet Union, and increase the value of Allied conventional forces 
dislocated on European soil.153 The concept of flexible response differed from concept of 
massive retaliation because the interaction of conventional and nuclear forces was 
planned as “mutually reinforced layers of escalation.”154 Nevertheless, the Multilateral 
Force Concept was a professional solution to military issues not to the political 
challenges that NATO experienced internally. This provides another reason for the 
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above-mentioned argument that internal issues among the allies proved to be the most 
dangerous and leaving a long-term impact during any time period, whether the Cold War 
or post-9/11.155 Moreover, future decades—from 1966 to the end of the Cold War when 
NATO experienced the rise and fall of the détente age as well as the renewal of the Cold 
War and the “Dual-track Strategy”—proved that the reasons for Allied ability or inability 
to withstand threats such as a strike of strategic nuclear weapons should be sought inside 
NATO and within a political processes of strategic meaning.  
5. NATO’s Bargaining Strategy: the Policy of Détente  
The unclassified part of the concept of flexible response was Harmel Report on 
the Future Tasks of the Alliance that defined NATO’s policy with the Soviet bloc until 
the end of the Cold War.156 The post-Cuban missile crisis, the French demarche and the 
development of force de frappe, as well as the recognition of two poles within 
international relations where both leading superpowers possessed enough capacity to 
ensure mutually assured destruction, pushed the Alliance to the search of new strategy 
and favored creation of the period of détente using NATO as a form of managerial 
mechanism.157 The general perception of the détente period was that this was an “era of 
negotiations” where the main emphasis was externally on bilateral and multilateral 
consultations among adversaries and internally within the Alliance among key member 
nations.158 Because of the transformations in international relations, Alliance members 
expected a subsequent NATO transformation in order to meet the requirements of new 
international realities. As a result, and given the response to allied expectations, the 
Harmel Report emphasized the value of increased bilateral consultations among the 
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superpowers, the use of NATO as a political consultative body for détente issues as well 
as the future guarantor of allied solidarity on collective defense issues.159  
Despite this special role for NATO in the period of détente, the allies had 
divergent views on the realization of détente in real life, which—in combination with 
external events such as the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia, the Vietnam War, the 
Yom Kippur war and other incidents on an international scale—clearly showed that 
superpower interests would clash whenever there was an open window of opportunity to 
spread the zone of influence.160 Moreover, for the Western European NATO members, 
détente signaled inconvenient transformations emphasizing the re-emergence of a 
strengthened realpolitik in the U.S. and Soviet relations resulting in European NATO 
members being subordinated as secondary role states regarding collective defense ideas 
and common values that were in the foundations of NATO.161  
6. Challenge of Strategic Defense Initiative and Soviet Decline 
The remaining years of the Cold War symbolized an increased arms race between 
the superpowers, which was merely paused in part by the détente period.162 The “peace 
through strength” with NATO as center piece, along with the monolith U.S. Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) on the one side and the Soviet technologic development on the 
other, and the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe caused 
NATO to make decisions about strengthening Europe with other missile forces.163 
Obviously, this situation helped keep NATO together and proved the validity of the 
Alliance in the eyes of Western leaders. Nevertheless, NATO was not able to stop the 
arms race. Among other reasons related to continued proliferation in the Soviet Union, 
one of the most important reasons within the Alliance was related to different threat 
perceptions on both sides of Atlantic with regard to possible nuclear war and its 
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outcomes. For Americans, the deterrence of nuclear weapons symbolized a war that was 
thousands of miles away from U.S. soil, therefore it was psychologically more acceptable 
to consider nuclear war as a potential outcome of a confrontation between the two 
superpowers; for Europeans this war meant that their “homeland was the potential 
battlefield, whether or not nuclear weapons were used by either side.”164 These different 
threat perceptions explained allied divergent views on the ways and means NATO had to 
assure collective defense guarantees. For Europe, there was greater emphasis on political 
communication where fear of finding itself in the center of a nuclear confrontation did 
not allow drawing red lines in relation to Soviet foreign policy ambitions, partly because 
of the strong social democrat movements at the domestic level.165 For the U.S., there was 
a more realist political approach from the world’s superpower, which was achieved 
through the Strategic Defense Initiative and other strategies aimed to defeat the Soviets 
by any means.166   
The political ambitions of the United States and the several European allies then 
reached another level that went under the term “out-of-area” operations and defined the 
Alliance’s responsibility to defend itself in territories that were far from the North 
Atlantic region, for example, in Africa or Southwest Asia.167 These concerns of 
collective defense were characteristic of Allied nations’ national political interests in the 
regions of former colonial interests. In this regard, NATO was a suitable organization to 
ensure that separate nations did not exceed the limits of common interests and thus cause 
danger to the NATO and Soviet relationship or create another world war. At the same 
time, the change of political leadership in the Soviet Union provided NATO with a new 
geopolitical change that the Alliance managed to survive despite being created for the 
situations such as the Cold War. 
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E. THE POST-COLD WAR SHIFT TO NEW THREATS AND 
CHALLENGES 
The unexpected outcome of the Cold War brought new challenges and new 
threats that the North Atlantic community had to deal with. NATO, as an organization 
built to fight a large-scale nuclear and conventional war against the Soviet Union, lost its 
main contestant and had to deal with new challenges: 
While conventional dangers were declining, there was a corresponding 
increase in the probability of a different, multifaceted, and hard to contain 
type of risk. In the European context, security was becoming indivisible. 
The spotlight was now turning to existent or potential domestic problems, 
particularly those associated with the former communist countries.168  
The years following the fall of the Berlin Wall confirmed that a nuclear threat was 
no longer the greatest danger to NATO, there were echoes of collapses in the Soviet 
Union but not every case resulted in the peaceful re-creation of independent states but 
instead resulted in bloody wars in the former Yugoslavia, Caucasus, and Moldova.169 On 
the one hand, the Alliance was the victor because the “combination of allied détente, 
deterrence, and defense policies contributed to the events that culminated with the 
dissolution of Warsaw Pact, and disintegration of the Soviet Union.”170 On the other 
hand, changes in international relations and tensions in post-Cold War Europe generated 
new threats that left significant internal influence within the NATO and allied members’ 
interrelationship.  
There were primarily state concerns about the future of NATO as an organization. 
There were sound considerations kept alive by Soviet leaders as well as separate political 
elite representatives among the allies, that NATO had no added value without its enemy 
and the Alliance, like the Soviet Union, had to dissolve.171 There was also another side 
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that supported the continuity of the Alliance for different reasons. For Germany, for 
example, the existence of NATO meant further U.S. involvement in European defense 
that subsequently assured German reunification and a multilateral agreement over a 
unified Germany’s place in NATO among the United States, Germany, and Russia.172  
For France it was an opportunity to diminish U.S. influence in Europe and regain 
its political authority in Europe and in the world while at the same time continuing to flirt 
with NATO in case there was a necessity for help.173 The German aspirations also 
renewed French and British concerns over Germany regaining its might and thus trying to 
resurge.174 Despite these concerns, growing pressures that resulted in a war in the 
Balkans, proved that NATO still had credibility in dealing with collective defense issues 
because no one was able to predict that at the end of twentieth century, Europe would 
again face a conventional conflict where policy, religious differences, and socio-ethnic 
issues might be solved in the old-fashioned style of blood and iron.  
Finally, there were former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Republics that associated 
themselves with the democratic values of the Western world and clearly declared their 
willingness to join NATO in the spirit and letter of the North Atlantic Treaty and its 
Article 10, expressing determination to transform their political systems in habitus 
common with the political and institutional values and systems in Western Europe and 
the United States: 
 
 
Western decision makers were facing an unprecedented situation: instead 
of just having to strengthen and stabilize already existing liberal 
democratic values and institutions, the challenge in the new period was to 
help construct those institutions in states emerging from a long period of 
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Communist rule. The challenge, now, was no longer to secure and 
stabilize Western state identities, but to help build them from scratch.175  
Internal concerns, transformation attempts, and the motivation of former 
adversaries as well as instability in Eastern/Central Europe reflected a necessity to decide 
the future of NATO and the transformation of the Alliance. These changes would need to 
be able to deal with new challenges and prevent insecurity and instability of the post-
Cold War era, in which there were all the preconditions necessary to spread across 
Europe and develop another large-scale war. 
1. New Strategic Concepts and Enlargement Policy 
The London Declaration, authorizing the preparation of a new strategic concept 
and its subsequent approval at the Rome Summit in 1991, proved the uniqueness of 
NATO’s capacity to adapt again in 1990.176 Certain criticism, however, has been 
represented arguing that NATO’s victory and status as the only and strongest military 
alliance after the collapse of the Soviet Union did not motivate rethinking and 
improvement of NATO’s grand strategy.177 As a result, the Strategic Concept of 1991 
that was first such document of NATO being unclassified and released after 1967 
Strategic Concept was “rather a dull document, reiterating the changes that had already 
taken place in Europe, reaffirming its core functions, and suggesting preparedness for 
anything in a world that saw emerging threats as ‘multidirectional.’”178 The Alliance’s 
New Strategic Concept agreed upon the necessity to improve NATO’s capabilities in  
 
 
crisis management, the transformation of conventional forces with a more rapid reaction 
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and force projection capability, and the prevention of possible conflicts not only within 
NATO territory but also outside of it, specifically in Europe.179  
This concept also officially declared NATO’s commitment to cooperate with 
those Central and Eastern European states that proved their determination to contribute to 
collective security as well as declared their aspirations to join Western European 
institutions.180 Nevertheless, it was not enough for the allies to pass the test of a 
successful transformation from a Cold War military organization to an effective 
institution dealing with the new challenges executed in the conventional manner, as the 
war in the Balkans proved.  
The next step came with the 1999 Strategic Concept approved in the NATO 
Washington Summit of the same year.181 This concept was an improvement of the 1991 
Strategic Concept outlining “five core security tasks: security, consultation, deterrence 
and defense, crisis management, and partnership.”182 Yet, the Concept alone was not a 
solution to internal dispute among allies about further NATO enlargement, cooperation 
with former adversaries, and role in the new international order. 
2. Enlargement and Burden-Shifting 
The Allies did not share common views over the cooperation models with the 
Eastern and Central European aspirants or over their applicability to become full-fledged 
NATO members.183 Of course, in the early years after the end of the Cold War none of 
the NATO members seriously considered NATO enlargement in the Eastern direction 
and instead tried to carefully adapt the Alliance to a new international order and to the 
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changes in Eastern and Central Europe.184 In trying to find the best solutions for NATO’s 
further existence, the allies faced open internal disputes on a variety of issues.  
First, there was the old debate about the inadequate burden sharing between the 
U.S. and European allies, which became acute and visible when NATO European allies 
failed to prove that the war in former Yugoslavia was “the hour of Europe” to stop the 
conflict without U.S. assistance.185 The European response was toothless and reluctant to 
recognize that serious diplomatic measures were not working to stop the war in the 
Balkans. One should also agree that in response to the European commitment to solve 
problems on their soil by themselves, the United States’ subsequent reaction was that of 
non-involvement in the Balkan conflict.186 This, however, resulted in criticism within the 
United States itself and the new political course of the Clinton administration, which was 
determined to have greater involvement in the Balkans as well as to later support greater 
NATO expansion in the post-Soviet domain.187 America’s partial isolationism from 
European affairs did not help to solve the conflicts in the Balkans at their start but later 
served as reasonable basis to increase political support for those states that were willing 
to join Western European institutions. 
Second, the allies had different views on the topic of NATO transformation, 
especially regarding NATO’s enlargement and the future role of Europe and the U.S. in 
NATO. While European allies, especially France, saw an opportunity to strengthen 
European defense capabilities through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe and the Western European Union, the United States never recognized European 
attempts to undermine NATO, and subsequently the American role within the 
organization, nor did they recognize separate European states’ plans for the Alliance’s 
replacement.188 Paradoxically, as much as the United States was considered the guarantor 
of European defense, it was not willing to allow an increase of European positions as the 
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unified world power.189 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was the 
only remaining world’s superpower and it did not want to lose this position to anyone. 
Third, regarding further NATO activities in a post-Soviet space through 
enlargement, the allies were reluctant to consider such an option because of possible 
Russian reactions to it.190 Even knowing that the former Soviet military might was gone, 
the allies still recognized Russia’s nuclear superpower status and did not want to be 
involved in growing tensions because of euphoric NATO’s policies, which would draw 
new red lines in NATO-Russia relations.191 Nevertheless, through strong U.S. support 
and trilateral communication between the Clinton, Kohl, and Yeltsin administrations as 
well as through established organizational and political instruments such as the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace program and later the instrument 
of the Membership Action Plan, the enlargement process started in the most peaceful and 
diplomatic way possible.192 This show of good form, of course, did not stop allies from 
further bargaining over their candidate preferences and the possible goods separate allies 
could receive for supporting the accession of one candidate or another (e.g. Turkey’s 
request for membership in the European Union (EU) in exchange for supporting the 
accession of new member states or France’s support to Hungary and Romania).193  
Finally, attempts to find the best formula for NATO’s transformation, in 
combination with external threats influencing Western European security as well as 
aspirations of former Soviet bloc countries, required an updated strategic concept in order 
to not derail the Alliance from its post-Cold War survival policy. This came together with 
the celebration of NATO’s fiftieth anniversary at the Washington Summit of 1999. 
Divergent views of NATO included NATO as a global organization with increased 
involvement in crisis management and collective security, which was supported by the  
 
                                                 
189 Ibid., 216. 
190 Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 112. 
191 Ibid., 112. 
192 Sloan, Permanent Alliance?: NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama, 104–115. 
193 Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 113–115. 
 65 
U.S. and Great Britain, or NATO as a regional collective defense organization with lower 
level ambitions and unwilling allies contributing more for out-of-area operations 
executed without a United Nations (UN) mandate.194  
At the end of the twentieth century, NATO better than other international 
organizations was prepared to defend allies from the threats characteristic to the last 
decade of this century. Yet, similarly to other state and non-state actors, NATO failed to 
predict and prepare to defend its allies for challenges that pushed Alliance to another 
strategic shift in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Different types of threats will be on the daily agenda of NATO as long as it 
continues to exist as a collective defense or collective security organization depending on 
the necessity of the allies. Since 1947, when Western European states together with the 
United States started to build the new security architecture of international relations, there 
were divergent perceptions about the most suitable solutions based on different state 
experiences and political ambitions. The creation of NATO was made as a compromise 
between national expectations, political ambitions and external threats projected by the 
Soviet Union. It is sometimes hard to predict whether one action by the Alliance or 
another, in the form of political declaration, strategic concept or real deployment of 
nuclear missiles and troops, was dictated because of the imminence of Soviet threats or 
because of the internal considerations and divergent political agendas dictated by 
domestic policies and their political elite members with more or less charismatic 
personality and political charm. Similarly, one may question whether deterrence and 
détente as well as the outcome of the Cold War were a result of a reluctance and lack of 
cooperative action or because the Alliance was effective in achieving its political goals.  
One thing is clear: Despite the fact that it has never been able to fulfill its force 
goals, NATO has been the most powerful military organization since its inception and 
still keeps that title. NATO has proven that collective defense primary is political and 
strategic interaction with the use of military capability as one of available instruments not 
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vice versa. This proves that unless there is a stalemate within NATO over what the 
external threats are and how to deal with them, even with the permanent presence of 
burden shifting which happens more than burden sharing, NATO has been able to 
withstand, prevent, or at least manage all kinds of threats or violence that have been 
projected against its member states for more than the last sixty years.   
Nevertheless, despite the success of the first NATO enlargement and a rather 
successful long-term involvement in the Balkans, specifically in Kosovo, the allies were 
far from a convergent understanding about NATO’s role and mission on the eve of the 
new millennium. Unfortunately, the internal dispute was not the projector of the external 
threats that Alliance had to foresee in order to predict the future influence of allied 
defense after the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001. Moreover, it is 
possible to speculate that unresolved internal discussions or even conflicts among the 
allies within NATO did not allow members to concentrate on or recognize the growth of 
brand new external threats, which swept away a number of permanent values of the 
international order, creating dangers to the collective defense that were previously 
considered minor and unimportant.  
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IV. CASE STUDY: NATO AND CYBER THREATS/ATTACKS: 
LEGAL ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
In April of 2007, the Estonian government took the decision to remove from its 
capital, Tallinn, the “bronze soldier” monument that was built there to honor the Soviet 
victory over Nazi Germany. There followed riots in the streets, mainly by ethnic Russian 
youth protesting the decision, as well as other troubling shows of destructive dissent:  
Estonia experienced large-scale computer network attacks against government and 
banking websites.195 While suspicions and emotions have run high, Estonia never has 
received clear evidence that government of the Russian Federation sanctioned or 
sponsored those attacks.196 
These denial-of-service attacks seemed coordinated by their nature and damaged 
both the economy and the prestige of the Estonian government, as well as a people that 
used to be considered as the most “wired society” in the world.197 Those cyber-attacks, 
however, did not cause human casualties or destruction of Estonian critical infrastructure 
objects.  
In August 2008 the war between Georgia and Russia broke out. Along with the 
conventional conflict, Georgia experienced massive cyber-attacks against its government, 
banking services and, what was most important, media websites, which denied Georgian 
citizens and the international media objective official information about the war and the 
situation in the country.198 Similarly to Estonia, cyber-attacks against Georgia had 
unknown origins (despite suspicions that they were coming from Russia); they did not 
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cause human casualties but mainly were used as part of information warfare, as a 
propaganda instrument to discredit the Georgian president and government, as well as to 
violate information space.199  
One may only wonder what would have happened if Georgia had not received 
assistance from Estonia, the United States, and other countries that supported Georgian 
official government and media websites from servers located in these states.200 Could 
Russia have used the effective blackout to push all the way to the Georgian capital, 
Tblisi? This war was strongly based on provocation, propaganda, deception, 
concealment, and information warfare. Therefore, whoever could claim decisive victory 
in the information space would have gone a long way toward decisive victory in the 
conflict itself.  
One may also speculate about the limits of the “next cyber-attacks201” against the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s member states. What would NATO do if the “next 
cyber-attack” broke down air traffic control center communication systems of London 
Heathrow Airport causing crash of the aircrafts? What would be the reaction of NATO if 
cyber-attacks interrupted the transportation system of Deutsche Bahn in Germany, or 
cooling systems of nuclear power plants in South Texas, causing mass casualties? Is there 
a legal basis of the Alliance to take countermeasures and declare Article 5 or at least 
Article 4?  
What would be NATO’s reaction if cyber-attacks were part of complex hybrid 
threat constellation? May one consider low-level computer network attacks on civilian 
targets of NATO member states as jus ad bellum? Where does international law support  
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NATO attempts to defend from cyber-attacks and where it does not?  This chapter asks 
all of these questions with an eye toward the international-legal framework, which poses 
its own challenges to NATO’s response to hybrid threats.  
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DILEMMA OF REGULATING 
CYBERSPACE VIOLENCE  
The expert group that tailored the New NATO Strategic Concept recognized the 
growing presence of cyber threats in the daily agenda of the Alliance, as do those who 
must deal on a daily basis with the menacing effects of cyber-attacks.202 In a worst-case 
scenario, the impact of cyber threats on state security may equal weapons of mass 
destruction in terms of lethal potential. Certainly, events in Estonia were only the opening 
scene of the future cyber warfare. 
The problem, speaking in very simplified terms, is that there is no legal consensus 
on how to deal with cyber threats when there is no visible threat actor thus the question of 
how to defend from cyber-attacks is far from solved. The mixed ability of states to deal 
with cyber threats on a national level will not provide a viable solution for the Alliance, 
especially if there is need for a collective action that might include retaliation both in 
cyber space or one of a kinetic nature. In this connection, NATO’s issue, along with 
nation states, is that at the international level one may find diplomatic, political, and 
technologic interaction among state and non-state actors that want an effective response 
to cyber threats but there is no legal cooperation that would define the basic rules and  
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create norms for an international regime against cyber threats.203 As a result, NATO 
should consider the creation of a normative environment within itself in order to stand 
against cyber threats or continue relying on existing Law of Armed Conflict. 
1. Where does “Cyber Issue” Belong—the National or International 
Level? 
There exists no efficient internationally binding regime that would be effective in 
persuading the majority of states that a common action against cyber threats is in 
everyone’s interests just as the same as with the nonproliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.204 Subsequently, the inability of international law to deal with cyber threats 
opens a window of opportunity for rogue state and non-state actors to execute cyber-
attacks against NATO members and other states, therefore making them a very effective 
instrument of strategic action.205 Cyber threats do not fall under rules clearly explained in 
binding international laws that prohibit the use of force in general terms and explain that 
acts such as military invasions, bombardments, blockades, and other kinetic actions must 
be considered as primary methods of political solutions.206 For example, despite their 
status and binding nature, UN Charter’s Article 2(4) and Article 51 are not made to 
employ legal constraints in cyber space. These norms were created to restrain 
conventional type aggression and might not be applicable for cyber-attacks.207 In fact, the 
                                                 
203 Maeve Dion “Different Legal Constraints For State Responsibility,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, Estonia, (2010): 67. 
204 Ryan T. Kaminski “Escaping the Cyber State of Nature: Cyber Deterrence and International Institutions,” 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, Estonia, (2010): 88–
91. 
205 Building offensive capabilities in the cyber space is the most grateful area for those state and non-state actors that 
want to undermine existing international regime and achieve their political and economic goals by humiliating other 
state and non-state actors in nonconventional way. According to James Lewis (2009), Director of the CSIS Technology 
and Public Policy Program, “We should not forget that many of the countries that are havens for cybercrime have 
invested billions in domestic communications monitoring to supplement an already extensive set of police tools for 
political control. The notion that a cybercriminal in one of these countries operates without the knowledge and thus 
tacit consent of the government is difficult to accept,” cited by Ryan T. Kaminski “Escaping the Cyber State of Nature: 
Cyber Deterrence and International Institutions,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Conference 
on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, Estonia, (2010): 86. 
206 Sean D. Murphy, Principles of International Law (Concise Hornbooks, 2006), 439–441. 
207 Matthew C. Waxman “Cyber Attacks as “Force” under UN Charter Article 2 (4),” in Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo 
and Daria P. Wollschlaeger ed. International Law and the Changing Character of War, (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval 
War College, 2011), 44. 
 71 
UN Charter was created during a time when cyber threats were science fiction and no one 
could imagine warfare within a virtual dimension.208 On the other hand, it has been 
admitted that Article 2(4) does not speak directly about the instrument that has been used 
for force projection but about the outcome of what exact instrument of coercion has been 
used: 
Article 2(4) looks not at the instrument used but its purpose and general 
effect: that it prohibits coercion. Kinetic military force is but one 
instrument of coercion, and often the easiest to observe. At various times 
some States—usually those of the developing world or, during the Cold 
War, the “Third World”—have pushed the notion that “force” includes 
other forms of pressure, such as political and economic coercion that 
threatens State autonomy. In this regard Offensive cyber-attack 
capabilities such as taking down government or private computer systems 
share some similarities with kinetic military force, economic coercion and 
subversion, yet also have unique characteristics and are evolving 
rapidly.209 
From this perspective, cyber threats do not expose kinetic character by themselves 
but they are still similar to other types of threats and cyber-attacks have been created with 
the aim to make states or individuals suffer. Cyber threats being similar to other threats 
are among reasons that generate the creation of the law of war and rules of 
engagement.210  
Such an interpretation of Article 2(4) would be enough for NATO to legitimize 
specific defense measures against cyber threats. The threshold issue, however, remains on 
the level of the individual responsibility of states and how they interpret cyber threats. 
Moreover, the interpretation of cyber threats in the framework of the UN Charter, and its 
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Article 2(4), is expected to be highly different because states have different capabilities to 
protect themselves as well as different capabilities to project cyber tools as a strategic 
advantage.211 The normative and resource disparity, of course, makes NATO’s attempts 
to find common legitimate foundations for cyber defense even more complicated because 
each of the twenty-eight member states can legally have a different understanding of 
what are really cyber threats and what countermeasures might be considered as 
appropriate. The case of cyber-attacks in Estonia in 2007 is an approval of different 
views showing that the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty were not helpful 
instruments, along with other issues that incognito attacks in cyberspace can always 
bring. 
The issue of legal divergence is politically recognized and taken into 
consideration not only by NATO but also by a large portion of the United Nations 
members as well as international organizations such as the European Union, Organization 
of American States, the United Nations, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation and many others.212 Cyber-attacks, cyber-terrorism, 
cyber-crime and other types of violence in cyberspace are not merely a concern of one 
single nation or organization what proves that unitary international legal regime is 
required. In this regard, cyberspace domain must be treated as a global common that is 
constructed by humans, embedding other existing domains of land, sea, air, and space 
representing permanent changes and developments unknown even for subject matter 
experts of the field.213 
2. International Humanitarian Law on Cyberspace 
Despite the contemporary nature of cyberspace, its virtual decentralization and 
ability “to be everywhere,” it is hard to believe that current construction of the 
international law is obsolete against cyber attacks or other types of violence in 
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cyberspace. International society has already experienced other areas that under certain 
conditions have been similarly decentralized and of very contemporary nature like 
cyberspace. Here one may mention customs and treaties that regulate international 
commerce and business relations. Furthermore, international humanitarian law must be 
considered as an invention of recent past but its universal meaning has no expiration date 
as well as it is hard to undermine the universality of norms that are included in this 
law.214 Experts have focused their attention on international humanitarian law (IHL) in 
order to define a common legal basis acceptable to all international actors.  
Even though IHL was generally developed in order to deal with kinetic conflicts, 
its tenets are helpful for defining cyber-attacks and thus cyber threats in general as armed 
conflicts. In the framework of IHL, cyber-attacks might be recognized as an instrument 
within an armed conflict that is comparable with other means of warfare capable of 
making individuals suffer and states unable to function.215 Legal experts, like Schmitt, 
have also addressed the issue of targets in cyber-attacks that make cyber threats even 
more dangerous and requiring greater necessity for strict legal regulations. Examples of 
such targets include critical infrastructure objects, state or privately owned, that are 
operating under computerized and automated systems, e.g., nuclear power plants, pipe 
lines, airport controls, dams, dykes, and other mechanisms that, in the case of an attack, 
might cause a number of casualties among populations.216 Thus cyber threats as part of 
cyber operations used for cyber-attacks separately or as part of bigger military or non-
military operation represent a form of attack that is similar to kinetic attacks and causes 
of death or injury among civilians.217  
The issue, however, is that cyber threats may not result in viable consequences of 
civilian casualties and destroyed infrastructure, as is the case in conventional or irregular 
warfare. In this regard, it is hard to apply IHL even in a case when the intent of the 
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warring parties was not tracked to use cyber space in order to harm the opposite side. 
Consequently, it is not possible to apply IHL in speaking about recognizable evidence 
that one or another type of warfare has injuries and damage to civilians, especially if the 
cyber-attack was directed at military or dual-use targets, not civilian.218 Yet, despite 
these existing caveats, IHL gives a “helping hand” to NATO, which needs a legal basis 
for taking a much stronger position against cyber-attacks and implementing more 
effective measures. Several arguments speak to this issue.  
First, IHL is internationally recognized and has a prestigious codex of binding 
norms. Second, on the basis of IHL, in the future NATO along with other organizations 
has an opportunity to create new international circle of norms that would restrain anarchy 
in the cyber domain. Third, cyber-attacks represent a slippery slope because it is hard to 
define where military vs. civilian spaces start and end. These previously separated worlds 
are so interdependent and technically so connected that cyber-attacks, which at the start 
were directed toward military targets, could easily transform into an attack on civilian 
targets. The latter fall under IHL, giving a state or an organization such as NATO the jus 
in bello and subsequently jus ad bellum if considered an appropriate response to stop the 
violence.  
Nevertheless, IHL does not solve the legal regime issue for cyber defense because 
it does not speak to cyber-attacks nor is it covered in the UN Charter. As a result, states 
that actively use cyber space for their rogue actions cannot be taken to trial or put under 
any kind of sanctions because of the high degree of normative interpretation. This does 
not only include the issue of the usually unknown sources of cyber threats, technological 
weaknesses, or political impotence. It directly refers to the issue that there still does not 
exist an international legal regime such as those that prohibit nuclear armament, the 
production of chemical and biological weapons, or other types of weapons of mass 
destruction, which is universally agreed on by not only NATO members but also  
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worldwide among all UN members and non-state actors. Still, there is a political task on 
the one hand and a permanent tendency of growing cyber threats on the other, requiring 
quick and effective solutions from the Alliance now. 
In sum, there are so many rules and norms that regulate cyber-crime on the 
national/state level attempting to regulate and prevent cyber threats that makes it for 
internationl level even more challening to create one common and universally binding 
regime: 
There are divergent legal systems and laws relating to cyber-crime and 
cyber-security; some countries have no laws relating to cyber-crime or 
cyber-security legislation while others have relatively advanced cyber-
security frameworks. There will always be the challenge of dual 
criminality issues between legal systems but without, at a minimum, an 
international framework to “track and trace,” there is little hope of 
catching the criminals.219 
The common problem for both international and national levels is that they all 
deal with some specific part or detail related to violence in the cyberspace not whole 
domain all together or; international laws are too blurry to be applied. In most cases these 
are national criminal laws that deal with the cyber-crimes that are international by their 
nature.220 This unclarity challenges any real consenus on fundamental questions: what 
are cyber threats, what must be considered as cyber attacks and who must be considered 
as cyber threat actors as well as what kind of response state and/or non-state actors are 
allowed to take. 
B. SCENARIOS AND SOLUTIONS 
Several scenarios have been modeled in order to seek a legitimate NATO 
consensus and approval for launching Article 4 consultations and Article 5 operations. 
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1. Scenarios 
The first scenario is based on the technological capabilities that are used to 
paralyze computer network systems of specific NATO nations and balance on cyber 
espionage and a level of intrusion that does not leave the Alliance any choice than to start 
a consultation procedure under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty or make a decision 
for counteraction considering the imminent threat of the cyber-attack and the right for 
self-defense.221 This scenario for a legitimate NATO jus ad bellum may work only under 
circumstances when the potential adversary is fully recognizable and there is strong 
approval that taken countermeasures will be launched against the perpetrator, not an 
innocent party. The case of cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 proved that this is not 
an easy task. Even if there are suspicions, actions under Article 5 or under law 
enforcement cannot be executed.222 
The second scenario is that cyber threats are part of a bigger threat constellation, 
or hybrid threats, thus playing the role of a bigger scenario that has been applied to 
weaken NATO defense capabilities and decapitate both civilian and military entities in 
order to achieve different ends.223 Although one may find this scenario theoretical, the 
case of Georgia in 2008, when cyber-attacks were part of the bigger armed conflict 
significantly helping one involved party in turning off Georgian official information 
channels, is recognized as an example that cyber threats have future within hybrid 
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governmental communication channels, critical infrastructure objects, and the private 
sector including banking services. Cyber-attacks started before the military phase and 
stopped with ceasefire declared on August 12.225 
The third scenario is the “use of cyber capabilities to degrade or deny decision-
making and associated command and control capability, and/or achieve information 
superiority in the field of strategic communications, both of which may make a 
significant contribution to campaign success.”226 This scenario one might consider as a 
continuation of previous hybrid threat scenarios where cyber threats in the form of 
specific actions supplement information operations, deception, concealment, and 
propaganda. For instance, the main point of gravity in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war was 
the information war that was executed by both sides. The information war started long 
before the military confrontation turned out and it is still ongoing after the end of the 
military conflict.227 Moscow successfully managed to use all its available sources created 
by the official government in the years of Putin’s governance. These included a variety of 
state run media services—everything from news agencies, televisions, radios and Internet 
sources to formally independent representatives of social media.228 NATO has to take 
lessons learned and seek appropriate solutions in the case of such a scenario, starting with 
the low-level computer network attacks launched against separate NATO members or 
Alliance all together.  
The fourth scenario that has been considered is the projection of cyber threats by 
individuals that are not representing governmental or military structures.229 Again, the 
case study of cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 proved the real-time applicability of 
such a scenario in which a “country’s [Estonia’s] electronic infrastructure was hit by 
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almost one million computers simultaneously, most of them hijacked from the United 
States by unknown elements inside Russia.”230 One might argue that this exact scenario 
might be the most challenging for NATO in order to make a legitimate interpretation of 
the North Atlantic Treaty and take subsequent action against individuals executing cyber-
attacks against NATO members. On other hand, it might be the simplest solution for 
NATO because dealing with rogue individuals that violate cyber space is considered as a 
criminal act that falls under states’ criminal legislations as well as being a subject of law 
enforcement institutions including international representations such as Interpol or the 
International Criminal Court. Yet, these and other scenarios seem to be based on more 
powerful rather than on legal instruments that law-abiding organizations have in their 
arsenal. Several solutions, however, based on historic experience might be applied. 
2. Solutions 
Cyber threats have occupied a new dimension of warfare and information spaces, 
which had not been exploited before last couple decades. However, the nature and 
character of those threats are similar to other threats the world has experienced before. 
When nuclear weapons were created and their force shown in practice during World 
War II, the international regime was not ready to deal with the spread of nuclear 
proliferation. Nevertheless, later there was the non-proliferation treaty and permanent 
members of the UN Security Council possessed nuclear weapons. Similarly, there are the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention that have been 
ratified by a majority of UN member states.231 There are even older international norms 
like the law of the sea, norms that regulate air traffic control, outer space, Antarctica and 
other global commons where states have agreed upon certain rules that bind every 
international actor.232 In each of these examples, the international society had to deal 
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with certain unique situations that also included threats if solutions were not found. The 
problem, however, is that states are not willing to achieve consensus on the common 
rules of an international regime that would restrict the wilderness of cyber space due in 
part to states’ national political agendas and national cyber policies.233  
On the one hand, states are interested in tracking down and punishing non-state 
actors that are projecting cyber threats on state territory. On the other hand, states want to 
leave this duty to the national, not international, level because it allows them the freedom 
to maneuver in legal terms but it does not prohibit them from building capabilities that 
might be considered as dangerous in the case of the existing international legal cyber 
regime.234 Of course, an international legal regime regulating rules in cyber space cannot 
be the only instrument of order but, instead, an effective tool of combined effort. That, 
however, is not going to become a reality while there is not a commitment among the 
majority of UN member states. This solution would be the most appropriate for NATO 
but, until it is transformed into the sound form of an international treaty, NATO must 
seek other ways to protect its allies from cyber threats. 
Another solution that might be less effective than the development of a new 
international regime is to continue the work that has already started within NATO related 
to finding solutions for cyber defense that are binding for NATO member and partner 
states. In this regard, political consensus has to be achieved between 28 member states, 
especially considering those situations when cyber threats have given reason for the 
activation of Article 4 or Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This task is because here 
allies must agree upon kinetic actions that might be taken against state and non-state 
actors out of NATO if necessary in specific situation.  
This consensus process would also be a significant step forward in finding 
solutions for countering hybrid threats considering the strong connection between hybrid 
and cyber threats. A positive aspect is that after the 2007 cyber-attacks against Estonia 
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence was created and one of its 
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tasks is to analyze and seek legal solutions related to NATO cyber defense.235 The 
products made by NATO of course will be subject to criticism and interpretation or the 
open ignorance of non-NATO countries, especially those that consider the Alliance as 
threat to their security. Yet participation in norm creation that might be binding for the 
entire international society will give NATO significant political credit when dealing with 
the cyber threat issue on a strategic level both internally within the Alliance and 
externally with other international actors. 
Finally, there is a solution based on the worst-case scenario or casus that is the 
creation of a normative regime as an outcome of a real life situation, usually of 
catastrophic consequences. Despite the fact that terrorism as a mode of irregular warfare 
has existed for long time, the attacks on United States’ soil on 11 September 2001 created 
a new and much more effective international legal regime in dealing with the fight 
against terrorist organizations in spheres that included the control of money laundering 
and other financial activities aimed to support terrorism, arms smuggling and illegal 
routes of arms export, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and finally, the 
cooperation to trace and put on trial separate individuals and terrorist organizations.236 
Although effective in creating new norms that are helping the international society in 
fighting against terrorism, it would still be the worst solution for NATO to evolve a form 
of a legitimate regime against cyber threats based on the catastrophic consequences and 
sufferings of allied members’ populations and the destruction of critical infrastructure 
objects under cyber-attacks. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The North Atlantic Treaty is a universal legal document that may serve as an 
appropriate instrument in the case that NATO faces an imminent cyber threat and 
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subsequent cyber-attack that may cause a catastrophic chain of reactions in combination 
with other types of threats, united in a hybrid threat constellation or separately used to 
decapitate technologies or influence information space. For this reason, however, the 
Alliance must show itself as a robust organization that is able to provide political 
consensus when cyber threats are projected against one or more NATO members. One 
does not need to doubt the outcomes when cyber threats emerge again with similar 
situations when compared to Estonia in 2007 or in NATO’s partner state Georgia in 
2008.  
Nevertheless, the Alliance would feel much more comfortable if cyber threats are 
regulated under a collective security shield and an established international regime that is 
founded upon the basis of a treaty ratified by the majority. The current international 
norms that regulate questions about collective security, rights for self-defense, jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello are obsolete because they have been created in order to regulate 
kinetic conflicts not cyber space, which was just science fiction at the time when 
documents such as the Geneva Conventions or the UN Charter were created. Therefore, 
there is space to maneuver for those state and non-state actors that are developing cyber 
warfare capabilities—not only for defense purpose but also for offensive objectives— 
because existing international law allows a wide interpretation regarding what might be 
considered a cyber-attack and what kind of defense states are authorized to realize. This 
leaves NATO, as an organization created on the basis of international law, with 
challenging conditions in which it has to seek its own solutions and legitimation for 
taking a justified response against those that project cyber threats against the Alliance.  
In this regard, NATO is forced to take action and create a cyber-defense doctrine 
that includes all possible kinds of responses. The New Strategic Concept gave political 
authorization for allied cooperation, strategic commands together with member nations 
are institutions that provide control and resources, and the center of excellence is a think 
tank that is seeking applicable solutions for both the Alliance’s needs and those of 
NATO’s partners. This combination makes NATO a crucial actor, not only at national 
and regional levels but also at an international level when dealing with the cyber threats  
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issue. NATO’s interest in finding solutions for cooperative cyber defense gives added 
value to the whole international system and does not exclude the possibility that NATO 
will be the founding organization to create new norms acceptable to everyone.  
It is still hard to predict exactly what kind of cyber threats might be considered as 
NATO’s jus ad bellum because each case is unique and scenarios in which cyber threats 
might emerge are complicated, not only from a legal aspect but also from political, 
diplomatic, and technological aspects as well. Nevertheless, NATO must continue its 
work in seeking the best methods to defend against cyber threats. Otherwise the Alliance 
might experience a repetition of a cyber 9/11 and subsequent improvements in cyber 
threats at all levels, which will undermine the spirit and letter of the North Atlantic Treaty 
as well as question the legitimacy of the Alliance itself. 
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V. CASE STUDY: RUSSIA—HYBRID THREAT ACTOR 
The Russian Federation’s official documents defining security policy and military 
strategy do not address the question of hybrid warfare—or rather, the Russians do not use 
this exact concept or terminology. However, this omission does not mean that Russia has 
not paid attention to contemporary security threats that other states characterize as hybrid. 
Indeed, Russia seriously addresses issues related to its capabilities in developing policies, 
strategy, and military performance that would be able to engage effectively in such 
dimensions as information warfare, cyber warfare, political sabotage, propaganda, high 
precision weapons, and the use of space. All these elements are part of the hybrid threat 
actor’s nature and modus operandi.  
The question this chapter asks is whether hybrid threats challenge Russia’s 
security and defense capabilities similarly as they do to NATO—or whether Russia is 
more interested in hybrid threats as means to achieve Russia’s political goals on the 
regional and international level? In addition, is the effective application of hybrid threats 
the answer to Russia’s ongoing attempts to undermine the global superpower status of the 
United States and restore itself to a position of global power? Finally, does Russia have 
enough capabilities to defend itself from hybrid threats? 
The truth, as this chapter demonstrates, lies somewhere in between. On the one 
hand, Russia has already proven its effectiveness in applying hybrid threats. Cases of war 
with Georgia in 2008, cyber-attacks in Estonia in 2007, and regime change in Kirgizstan 
in 2009 show the preparedness of Russian political, military and intelligence 
communities to fight an information war, organize and exercise cyber-attacks, penetrate 
other state actors with acts of the political sabotage, propaganda, and other instruments 
that prove themselves appropriate in specific situations. On the other hand, a reliance 
only on nuclear deterrence, its weakened military and decline of technologic capabilities, 
in comparison with the Western world and such countries as China, show that Russia 
itself is also very vulnerable and may be affected negatively when facing hybrid threats 
that are directed toward its own security. 
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A. THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF HYBRID WAR: THE RUSSIAN VIEW 
The end of the Cold War, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, has 
traumatized some of the post-Soviet political and military elite, which still nurtures 
strong sentiments about Russia as a global superpower with the reach of the former 
Soviet empire. In 2005, for one obvious example, Vladimir Putin, as the president of 
Russian Federation, declared that the Soviet Union's collapse was the “biggest 
geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”237 The “catastrophe” bespeaks an abiding fear of 
Western military superiority and the fragility of the Russian political regime before 
conventional and non-conventional applications. In this regard, hybrid threats in the 
Russian perception emerge on a political level that affects almost every other dimension 
related to the function of the state and society.  
As one result, the Russian military together with the political elite have declared 
that Russia faces threats in all spheres that are crucial to its survival.238 These threats are 
high especially due to the expansion of the U.S. political sphere of influence close to 
Russian borders; information warfare and the use of modern technologies—together with 
the social movement phenomenon—create a complex package of non-conventional 
threats that endanger Russia’s existence.239 Putin continues to claim that through 
different approaches utilizing non-conventional means there are forces that are trying 
constantly to provoke and destabilize the security situation at the Russian borders, thus 
spreading their influence and destabilizing security within Russia.240 Along with 
strengthening political and economic power in the region, Putin has stated the task of 
modernizing the armed forces by increasing their budget and investing in training, 
defense planning and command as well as modern weapon systems and precision guided 
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ammunition.241 Putin’s political narrative regarding Russia’s defense has been widely 
supported whereas those who did not agree with him were forced to step out of active 
policy roles (e.g. former Minister of Finance, Alexei Kudrin). 
1. Strategy Documents on Hybrid War 
Beyond the political declarations of contemporary threats, several documents—
such as the Russian National Security Strategy until 2020 and the Military Doctrine of 
2010—describe serious intents to create adequate defense capabilities against any kind of 
threat, especially those related to non-conventional means.  
The National Security Strategy considers the growing threat environment because 
of misbalance and political unilateralism in international relations that is mainly 
represented as a result of the United States’ policies and subsequent NATO expansion.242 
Among the variety of previously declared threats and challenges, the National Security 
Strategy addresses threats that are exercised in “sophisticated forms of illegal activity in 
the cybernetic and biological spheres and in high technology spheres.”243 The doctrine 
has clearly declared the task for Russia to modernize and improve its defense capabilities 
against any new form of threat through a comprehensive approach and use of diplomatic, 
economic, and military and other non-conventional means. 
Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine also has recognized that the next military conflict 
will differ from previous conflicts in which Russia has been involved. In these wars, the 
main emphasis will be on the use of information warfare that will allow for achieving the 
political goals of the perpetrator without using military means.244 The doctrine has 
declared that the military capabilities of the Russian armed forces will depend on its 
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ability to combine high-speed information processing capabilities with the application of 
modern weapon systems being able to destruct military and civilian objects of high 
importance thus accessing the strategic initiative.245  
Until now, the only visible improvements that could support building the 
necessary capabilities are related to the armed forces structural reforms in order to 
establish an effective command structure of the military. Changes have already been 
implemented in the new command and control structure system, which has established a 
new division in Russia’s regional military commands as well as applying a brigade level 
system in the armed forces.246 Still, there is no guarantee that the new command structure 
of the Russian military will be able to absorb and process information at a required level 
and thus allowing the military to act quickly and effectively in responding to any kind of 
threat, whether they are of a conventional or hybrid nature. 
Another attempt at finding solutions for exercising policies that would be able to 
deal with the contemporary threats of a hybrid nature is changing the Russian approach in 
organizing a geostrategic-level policy through new geopolitically focused principles or 
vectors.247 These vectors have basically been created according to the new division of 
Russia’s military commands (The Western Military District, The Central Military 
District, The East Military District, and The South Military District). Vector principles, 
however, have not created new paradigms in Russian policies on how to deal with hybrid 
threats. The vector policy has the same aim as the previous strategy within Russian 
geopolitics, which is to deter and weaken the U.S. and NATO influence in the world and 
in regions bordering the Russian Federation.  
Vectors, rather, must be considered as a smart application in attempting to explain 
the continuation of Russia’s formal cooperation policy with the United States and NATO 
while at the same time trying to weaken and decrease their military, political, and 
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economic capabilities by all available means.248 Such an approach shows visible attempts 
to create a system of political instruments that would allow Russia to project hybrid 
threats to the Western world. In this regard, military theorists and academic professionals 
are trying to provide their contributions in order to make existing political and strategic 
principles sound.  
2. Academia and Hybrid War 
Russian military theorists and representatives from civilian academic disciplines 
have tried to assist the military in improving their performance for decades. Reality 
reflects the critical conditions of the armed forces and that they are not able to achieve 
combat readiness in order to fight classic, conventional third generation-style maneuver 
warfare. However, the military and civilian academia have produced significant amounts 
of analyses and research papers on how to improve Russia’s security, defense 
capabilities, and military performance in facing different kinds of challenges, including 
those that might be considered as hybrid. This debate may be divided in two parts.  
First, is the academic input or ideas that have been realized and proven to be 
successful as user friendly to the Russian military. Among them, one may mention 
Russian military’s deception capabilities. Since the start of the twentieth century, Russia 
has always recognized the importance of such politico military disciplines as deception, 
concealment, disinformation, and mislead.249  The combination of these concepts or 
voennaya khitrsotj has helped Russia in number of wars and crisis situations, including 
World War II battles with the Wehrmacht and German intelligence, during the Cold War, 
and with the Chechen militant commander Shamil Basayev.250 Therefore, understanding 
of the importance of voennaya khitrsotj is of highest importance for those who want to 
engage in hybrid conflicts and project threats of a hybrid nature. Timothy Thomas has 
observed that Russian military, together with academic experts, have come to the 
conclusion that the winning party in twenty-first–century warfare will be the one able to 
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adapt its voennaya khitrsotj capabilities to the new threat environment with the added 
elements of cyberspace, social media, space, and other dimensions within global 
interdependence and new technologies.251  
The Russian military and academic experts have also invested in developing a 
variety of tactics, technics, and procedures in order to establish a decisive superiority in 
the information war against the United States, NATO, and China. One example, the 
reflexive control theory, was created in order to impact an adversary’s decision-making 
process, turning its assessment in a necessary direction and being persuaded that it has 
understood its opponent’s intentions.252 The method of reflexive control, which includes 
all possible elements of information warfare, propaganda, deception, deterrence, and 
concealment, fits the concept of hybrid warfare. Moreover, Russia had experience in 
exercising reflexive control during the Cold-War era and its wars in Afghanistan and 
Chechnya. Russian military experts have also noticed that the United States has practiced 
similar methods, which have been used to blame the U.S. for the collapse of the Soviet 
Union when it was trying to achieve the same level in the sphere of the U.S. Strategic 
Defense Initiative.253 Yet there are examples of military and academic interactions that 
have not helped establish visible or robust defensive and offensive capabilities in 
preventing or projecting hybrid threats. This angle of military and academic interaction 
also is more likely to cause harm rather than help develop robust capabilities for fighting 
hybrid wars. 
The improvement of military capabilities in fighting information warfare and 
understanding the principles of information and network-centric warfare, whose role in 
fighting modern wars, has significantly increased.254 And in-depth analysis represented 
in Military Thought leaves no doubt that Russian military theorists have well understood 
the importance of information warfare. They have also established conceptual grounds 
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through defining the scope, levels, impact, terminology, and other crucial aspects of 
information warfare. In comparison with many Western thinkers on that topic, Russian 
experts consider information warfare not only as a technologic dimension but primarily 
as a political struggle and political process of warfare where technology is merely one 
part of the bigger concept.255 They understand information warfare as an element that 
leaves strategic consequences on the whole process of war. As one of the most prominent 
Russian experts of information warfare, Rastorguyev, has stated: 
The final objective of an information weapon’s effect is the knowledge of 
a specific information system and the purposeful use of that knowledge to 
distort the model of the victim’s world. …there is no important difference 
between the terms IW, information struggle, and information battle.256 
Questions about information threats as well as the necessity to improve 
information warfare capabilities have been addressed in the National Security Concept, 
Military Doctrine, and Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation.257 One 
may find it deviant but by addressing questions of improving military capabilities in this 
area, Russian experts generally continue criticizing the United States and its NATO allies 
instead of offering visible solutions for improving their own military capabilities.258  
One may find similar tendencies in Russian analysis on the application of 
network-centric warfare as well as on the utilization of asymmetric means 
(nanotechnologies, information technologies weapons) in asymmetric environments (non-
conventional battle space).259 Leading Russian military theorists have reviewed both 
                                                 
255 Streltsov “Main Tasks of State Policy in the Field of Information Confrontation,”, 20-22; See also Timothy L. 
Thomas Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology Through Toughness, 146-147; Viktor D. 
Riabchuk “Issues of Military Science and Prognosis in the Obstacles of Intellectual-Informational Confrontation,” 
Voennaia Mysl (Military Thought), No. 5, (May 2008): 69. 
256Timothy L. Thomas Cyber Silhouettes: Shadows Over Information Operations, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Foreign Military Studies Office, 2005), 78. 
257 Thomas, Recasting the Red Star, 141. 
258 Ludmila Kokh “Conflict of Global Interest and National Security of Russia,” Voennaia Mysl (Military 
Thought), No. 6, (2011): 18; Aleksandr V. Serzhantov, Aleksandr P. Martofliak “Characteristics of the main features of 
modern military conflicts,” Voennaia Mysl (Military Thought), No. 5, (2011): 38-40; Evgenij O. Savchenko “Military 
Instruments and Realization Methods of the US Political Goals,” Voennaia Mysl (Military Thought), No. 4, (2010): 8–
9. 
259 Thomas, Recasting the Red Star, 186–187. 
 90 
Western and Soviet experiences and have created a theoretical basis for the further 
development of military capabilities related to engagement in hybrid wars with a 
prevailing non-conventional dimension.260 They have supporters in the Russian military 
elite, including the chief of the Russian General Staff, General Nikolay Makarov. He has 
recognized the necessity to improve armed forces capabilities in fighting asymmetric 
warfare in future wars where: 
(f)orms and methods will include the use of non-standard asymmetric 
(indirect) actions which can accomplish objectives more economically 
than direct clashes. They also include the use of combining different 
uniformed services that are able to operate autonomously in isolated areas 
with no close fire support and the use of raids and maneuvers deep in the 
adversary’s territory to seize and destroy critical facilities.261 
In addition, there are Russian scientists who are working in the field of 
information technologies. They are trying to provide the military with modern equipment 
of asymmetric armament, which would allow them to penetrate Western information 
systems as well as steal and develop new assets for Russia itself.262 Strategically there is 
also a certain determination to create and apply asymmetric instruments that would 
destabilize situations in third world countries, states, and regions that do not want to fall 
under U.S. global governance and political discourse.263   
Still, in attempts to create such capabilities equal to Western states, the biggest 
effort is dedicated to making criticisms and accusations against the United States and 
NATO. In this regard, Russian military theorists and academics have done more harm 
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than good to their own capability development. Concentrating on propaganda and making 
accusations against their former Cold War adversaries does not help in developing 
Russian hybrid warfare doctrine. Yet, this does not mean that Russia does not have any 
real capabilities in fighting hybrid wars. The war with Georgia in 2008 showed that 
Russia uses more than just conventional power in order to achieve its political goals.   
B. CASE STUDY OF HYBRID CONFLICT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR IN 
2008  
In addition to an analysis on the Russian or Georgian military performance in the 
five-day war in 2008, one must also analyze the non-conventional dimension of this war, 
which was applied in combination with military means. Several analysts and experts have 
proven that the military actions of the Georgian armed forces, and the subsequent 
invasion of Russian armed forces into Georgia, represented the final phase of a large 
operation that consisted of the political elements, propaganda, subversion, provocation, 
cyber-attacks, and economic pressure on Georgia and its pro-Western Saakashvili regime. 
Ronald Asmus defined the Russian-Georgian relationship as a years-long covert Cold 
War.264  
Here one, of course, might question the assumptions of the Georgian President 
when he authorized a military attack on Tskhinvali, the capital of the separatist South 
Ossetia, and whether or not it was the most appropriate solution. Another question, 
however, focuses on the intents of Russia with regard to Georgia and the ways and means 
used by Russia in order to achieve its political objectives. This is the platform on which 
the question regarding Russia’s capabilities in projecting hybrid threats and fighting 
hybrid wars must be asked. In this regard, one must analyze Russia’s actions on political 
and diplomatic levels as well as steps taken to fight successful information warfare. 
1. Political Confrontation 
The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 established a pro-Western regime with 
its leader Mikhail Saakashvili.  His strong dedication to move Georgia away from Russia 
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through NATO and EU membership drove Putin and his regime into furious anger.265 
Russia openly warned Georgia many times about the consequences if it were to continue 
its political “escape.”266 In this regard, Russia did not hide its goals to keep control in the 
Caucasus. Georgia understood Russian intents and, in the end, decided to act with the use 
of force whereas “no Western diplomatic establishment nor NATO believed that a repeat 
of 1956 or 1968 was possible.”267  
Until the war in 2008, Georgia did not believe Russia’s provocations despite a 
variety of covert and non-conventional actions exercised by Russia. These actions 
included political and psychological pressure on the Saakashvili government (executed 
by Kremlin ministers and Putin himself), economic embargos (the most known was on 
wine and mineral water), attempts to infiltrate pro-Kremlin politicians in the Georgian 
government, espionage, terrorizing civilians by irregular shelling on the border of 
Georgia and South Ossetian region, and public attacks on Georgian officials in 
international meetings and the media.268 None of them were enough to provoke a larger 
conflict. As a result, Russia used the “separatist card” as the most sensible and weakest 
part of Georgia and biggest threat to its future aspirations.269 Russia had to find a reason 
for a decisive action in order to set a trap for Georgia in a way that the West would not 
manage to prevent. This reason was provided by two international events.  
The first event was Western support of Kosovo through de iure recognition. With 
this move, the Western world openly stood against Russian supported Serbia as well as 
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fired up Russia’s own fears about a continued Western intervention, especially from the 
United States in its zone of interest.270   
In 2006, Putin made a remark that “if somebody assumes that Kosovo can achieve 
full state independence, then why should we refuse it to the Abkhaz and South 
Ossetians?”271 After the recognition of Kosovo, Russia openly told Georgia that “they 
would now pay the price for Western policy on Kosovo.”272 Considering these open 
signals, one may assume that Western leaders did not fully assess the seriousness of the 
situation and the level of Russian motivation to close Georgia’s window of opportunity in 
getting away from the Russian zone of influence through a pro-Western course. 
A second event subsequently strengthened Russian positions. The NATO 
Bucharest Summit in 2008 did not grant Georgia or the Ukraine with NATO Membership 
Action Plan (MAP), thus sending clear signals to Russia that NATO states would not get 
involved if any further actions were taken.273 The summit finished with a compromised 
decision promising that Georgia and the Ukraine would become NATO members, which 
Russia translated as a step in its own favor and continued to increase pressure on 
Georgia.274 After the NATO Bucharest Summit Putin, as well as his Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov, came out with the announcement that Russia would do anything to 
prevent Georgian and Ukrainian accession to NATO as well as provide “practical 
assistance” to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.”275  
Despite Georgian attempts in finding a solution to the increasing tensions of 
having an open war with Russia, they failed because of Georgia’s inability to refrain from 
responding to Russian provocations and Russia’s dedication to return Georgia to their 
zone of influence by any means. Russia wanted to show the Western world that it would 
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decide what would happen with its neighboring regions. The West, at the same time, did 
not believe Russia’s intentions, and thus were not ready for this “Russian Gambit,” nor 
did they take “seriously enough small war in the periphery of Europe.”276 There was no 
back-up plan for Georgian defense after recognizing Kosovo’s independence; rather, 
there was the widely interpretable outcome of the NATO Bucharest Summit 2008, and 
the total Western misunderstanding of Georgian and Russian natures and their interaction 
within the framework of conflict.277  
It is hard, however, to declare that all these political and diplomatic actions could 
be characterized as patterns of the hybrid conflict. Russia executed strategic deception 
and diplomatic gambits against Georgia; one may find similar actions in the world’s 
history before both world wars and in a number of smaller conflicts during the Cold War. 
These actions have not excluded the use of hybrid warfare tactics but rather strengthened 
and established an appropriate environment for later military intervention. In this regard 
one must look at the information war that was executed before the start of military 
confrontation and during the conflict itself. 
2. Information War 
The main point of gravity for Russia in 2008 was that the Georgian war was an 
information war being executed by both sides. The information war had started long 
before the military confrontation began and it is still ongoing after the end of the military 
conflict.278 Moscow successfully managed to use all its available sources that the official 
government had created in the years of Putin’s governance. These included a variety of 
state run media services from news agencies, televisions, radios and Internet sources to 
formally independent representatives of social media.279 To make the task easier, 
Moscow identified three key themes that media had to develop in war against Georgia: 
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The first theme was to send the message that Georgian President 
Saakashvilli in particular and Georgia more generally was the aggressor; 
second, that Moscow had been left with no choice but to intervene in the 
defense of its citizens and their human rights and thus deserved 
unqualified support of the international community; and third, that the 
United States and the West had no basis for criticizing Russian actions 
because of NATO’s earlier actions in Kosovo and elsewhere.280  
Similar preparations were also realized on Georgian side. However, they were not 
as massive in numbers as the resources from the Russian side.281 Russia was definitely 
preparing for an information war and a direct propaganda campaign against Georgia 
before the war. There were prepositioned journalists in Tskhinvali before the start of 
shelling, fabricated media footages and war pictures, and the constant appearance of 
Russian political leaders and senior military officers bringing the narrative on air on a 
regular basis.282 Without repeating other works describing the Russian-Georgian 
information war in all its details, it must be considered that both sides achieved some 
victory in this dimension of war. If one looks at Russian side, its information operations 
succeeded in the fact that Russia received justifications for its actions and subsequent 
condemnations of Georgian actions from such Western (and also NATO members) 
countries such as Germany.283 Even after changing the tone of their criticism, these 
countries partially fell into the trap of Russian propaganda machinery and the strategic 
game Moscow was playing.  
Georgia’s only success in the information war was its quick reaction and 
capability to assess the situation in the public space. This resulted in regular and intensive 
communication through Western media, making the Georgian president the central 
provider of the message. Additionally, Georgia closed information channels coming from 
Russia and those involved in producing propaganda news. This may be speculation but 
Georgia’s suffering and the amount of territory lost from the Russian invasion would 
have been bigger if there had not been live media coverage forcing Russia to behave 
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more properly in order to not lose its strategic objectives by showing itself as the pacifier 
not the aggressor. Aside from the Russian military performance and its weaknesses, the 
world must learn the lesson that Russia was well prepared for fighting a modern war and 
in achieving its political goals with the assistance of media. 
Another aspect that showed Russia’s effectiveness in the contemporary conflict 
was the use of cyberspace in order to decapitate Georgian electronic media, governmental 
communication channels, critical infrastructure objects, and the private sector such as 
banking services. Cyber-attacks started before the military phase and stopped at the time 
of the declared ceasefire on August 12.284 The cyber-attacks on Georgia in 2008, as well 
as in Estonia in 2007, showed Russia’s attempts to create the powerful non-conventional 
capability to fight in cyberspace.285 Moreover, cyber operations against Georgia were 
integrated in the general plan and were realized according to the previously established 
political and military objectives.286 As such, it would be shortsighted to look at Russia’s 
military performance only from the criticism addressed to its military performance. The 
invasion of Georgia was the first real operation that implemented conventional and non-
conventional instruments in the combined battle space. While it was not outstanding nor 
did it provide a decisive victory, the war with Georgia showed Russia to be a serious 
candidate in being capable to project hybrid threats and fight hybrid wars in the future. 
3. Use of Criminalist Paramilitary Units 
One more aspect proving Russia’s attempts to influence Georgian side was use of 
irregular Chechen units including the notorious Vostock Battalion. For most of the 
Western World these units do not mean anything than other entities of the Russian Armed 
Forces located in the Caucasus region. For Caucasian populations, the Vostock Battalion 
is the worst nightmare of modern type mercenaries who were used to bring “the 
destruction against economic targets and Georgian property that can only be classified as 
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terrorism, targeted killings and looting.”287 The use of covert criminalists who have been 
legalized by the state-actor to exercise war crimes against civilian populations is nothing 
more than another edge of the hybrid warfare. Finally, in 2012 Russia’s president Putin 
recognized that Russia had invasion plan for Georgia and one of the tasks was to train 
and prepare South Ossetian militia units for the indirect warfare with Georgia because 
they were not able to conduct warfare as conventional units but were effective enough to 
serve as auxiliary forces for whatever purpose Russian command would task them.288  
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Russia has enough capabilities to engage in hybrid wars as well as project hybrid 
threats against small neighboring states like Georgia and Estonia. During Putin’s regime, 
the intelligence and military special operations apparatus had not lost its grit in executing 
information operations, espionage, subversion, sabotage and other actions that are related 
to the penetration of a potential adversary’s sovereignty, political stability and the socio-
ethnic conditions of its society. There is full support from the political level and the 
development of sophisticated non-conventional instruments has been officially declared 
as a priority in number of strategic level documents.  
Furthermore, political and military practitioners receive full support and huge 
involvement from the academic field. Russia has always proved that it possesses strong 
theoretical potential both from military and civilian theorists. Currently, the biggest 
investment has been in making detailed studies of Western experiences and lessons 
learned from the United States and NATO allies. Yet, the academic field suffers from 
ideological impact thus the focus is more on subjective criticism about Western political 
motivations and the global reach of American foreign policy. This makes academic input 
obsolete and not applicable to the real-life threat environment.  
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Meanwhile, one may doubt Russian capabilities to defend itself from hybrid 
threats posed to its own security. Of course, another question is about the motivations and 
necessity of the states to engage in a cyber-conflict with a nuclear superpower that has 
weakened, albeit still large, conventional, political, and economic power. However, 
Russia has already felt Chinese interest in stealing Russian industrial secrets and the 
Chinese capacity in reverse engineering. In this regard, the limitations of the military 
industrial complex and the lack of skilled human resources may have a serious impact on 
Russia’s capabilities in future.  
Nevertheless, Russia has proven that it will use its window of opportunity and 
create the fog of war by executing hybrid warfare against states in the region in order to 
satisfy its imperial ambitions and retain the status of a global, or at least regional, super 
power thus changing the international order. NATO should take its lessons learned from 
that and understand what it can and what it cannot do in order to manage and if possible 
neutralize such hybrid-threat actors like Russia and other states or non-state actors that 





VI. NATO IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
Shortly before the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012, Jamie Shea cited Winston 
Churchill, who once said “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. So now we must 
think.”289 Later in the same article Shea added: 
NATO will have to track potential threats at a much earlier stage and 
achieve a more sophisticated understanding of how hybrid threats are 
formed from the interconnection of trends such as terrorism, narcotics, or 
organized crime.290 
Like Jamie Shea, many other experts from NATO member states or non-NATO 
countries have recognized that war in the twenty-first century will be different than it was 
decades ago. In this kind of war the battle of narrative will be more important than battle 
of a kinetic nature itself.291 Nevertheless, NATO has experienced changes in warfare 
since its inception and rise of new threats is nothing new to the Alliance. Moreover, 
NATO will be involved in more out-of-area operations after withdrawing its forces from 
Afghanistan, including responses to state and non-state actors.292 NATO has 
responsibility for these crises because of the potential that they will spread into allied 
territory either directly as armed conflict or in such spillover effects as mass influxes of 
refugees or economic pressures. 
These are just some of external challenges NATO is facing in a post-9/11 world 
of security. In addition, internal challenges for the Alliance are no less serious. First, the 
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burden-shifting strategy is becoming more intensive and “bloody” due to an economic 
depression in most NATO member countries as well as the U.S. plans to reduce its 
defense expenditure and shifting its attention closer to the Middle East and South East 
Asia where challengers to the United States and the global commons are developing at a 
high operational tempo. Last but not least, NATO is an organization that is successful 
when it is able to actualize itself in major operations where all command structures are 
working and kept busy.293 After ending its major operations in Afghanistan, which have 
gone on for more than a decade, NATO services will still be required because of the 
unique capacity the Alliance possesses.  
It is certainly true that in a post-9/11 world NATO allies have divergent views 
over the question of what should be considered as a threat to the Alliance and what 
should be the role of NATO in the following decades. Despite the promise the New 
Strategic Concept adopted in 2010, which was to satisfy expectations of all NATO 
members, in reality it is more than obvious that there is still divergence not only between 
both sides of the Atlantic but also within Europe. There are allies that still consider 
Russia as the main threat to their sovereignty (and the war with Georgia in 2008 was 
more than visible proof of that), while others like “France and Portugal did not wake up 
in the night fearing an insurgent Red Army.”294 There are allies that want to see NATO 
as a global player such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France and allies 
that are willing to see Alliance with less ambitions but being able to fulfill its current 
tasks and missions without putting a greater burden on allied members’ weakened 
economies.295  
Finally, the burden-sharing/-shifting issue has been more than a hot topic among 
allies because of austerity within the Eurozone as well as the changes of the U.S. strategic 
direction towards Southeast Asia. The wars of last decade, the American contribution to 
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the NATO common budget and the recent NATO operations in Libya do not speak for 
the Alliance as being able to counter hybrid threats with the decreased American 
involvement whether of a financial or resource nature.296  
A. NATO’S CURRENT “ARSENAL” AGAINST HYBRID THREATS 
NATO is organization that has survived because of being in permanent adaptation 
process and being able to transform according to the threats it experiences. Moreover, 
NATO has several strategic level instruments like North Atlantic Treaty, strategic 
concepts that formulates tasks, defines threats and ways how to fight with them as well as 
legitimizes cooperation between NATO members and NATO partners already on the 
established and proven basis what might be disadvantage of the hybrid threat actor 
because it does not possess such cooperative structures nor it has legitimate basis for that. 
Furthermore, NATO has strategic institutions—strategic commands that are responsible 
for the implementation of the tasks described in the strategic concepts and defense of the 
values of the North Atlantic Treaty. The biggest challenge for these commands is to 
apply right instruments that are enough effective to prevent or manage hybrid threats.  
Hybrid threat actors can easily threaten NATO’s security within the territory of 
the Alliance despite the fact that NATO troops are deployed outside its borders with the 
direct aim to prevent the spread of threats and violence within the North Atlantic 
territory. Therefore, more than ever NATO must have necessary arsenal of strategic 
instruments through which to manage the danger of the hybrid threats and deter the 
hybrid-threat actors to the extent that NATO’s member states and their populations do 
not experience repetition of “hybrid 9/11.” The relevant components include the norms of 
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the North Atlantic Treaty, the NATO Strategic Concept, NATO Strategic Commands, 
with their military and civilian potential, and also NATO’s partnership with a significant 
number of the most powerful states around the world. 
1. North Atlantic Treaty 
Considering its role in countering hybrid threats, the North Atlantic Treaty might 
be considered a more persuasive document with its legal background than the United 
Nations Charter or international humanitarian law. This bold argument is based on the 
recent experience of the United Nations being unable to solve the crisis situation in Syria 
or to follow the letter and spirit of international humanitarian law on the basis of growing 
ignorance from the non-democratic state actors.297 In this regard, the North Atlantic 
Treaty seems to be more effective when applied in real action than either of the above-
mentioned documents. One should note that the consultation mechanism defined by 
Article 4 of the Washington Treaty has been shown to work much faster and more 
effectively. The recent request from Turkey to commit the North Atlantic Council to 
political consultations under auspices of Washington’s Treaty Article 4 speaks to this 
point.298 Being aware of the very nature of a hybrid threat’s quick reaction capabilities on 
the strategic level is among the most important virtues enabling the Alliance to project 
necessary force against potential hybrid-threat actors.  
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On the other hand, the Washington Treaty exposes the weakness of the Alliance 
from deterring hybrid threats or even guaranteeing certain legality of being involved in 
hybrid conflict. Article 5 provides guarantees only against armed attacks as a common 
agreement for mutual assistance while none of the new threats (e.g. cyber-attacks, the 
disruption of energy resources, political sabotage or open endangerment of the global 
commons) can be a matter of interpretation under this article.299 Furthermore, the 
Washington Treaty may be a weak instrument in helping the Allies reconsider the acts of 
hybrid threat actors because of the non-kinetic nature of the threats applied or just 
because only a minor part of the member states has suffered from cyber-attacks, the 
disruption of energy supplies or political sabotage. Others may not consider these 
activities as part of a hybrid war but rather merely marginal issues of a sociopolitical or 
criminal nature that do not mean any threats toward NATO in general. Due to this, other 
instruments, along with the North Atlantic Treaty, should be examined. 
2. NATO Strategic Concepts 
NATO Strategic Concepts serve as roadmaps for the Alliance with a longer 
perspective. They define allied policies, security interests, and set the stage for collective 
defense actions to be taken in the long-term. NATO Heads of State and governments the 
New Strategic Concept of November 19, 2010, which must be considered as the most 
appropriate document for dealing with dangers related to hybrid threat exposure and the 
possible emergence of hybrid conflict. Before the adoption of the New Strategic Concept 
Karl-Heinz Kamp noted that: 
The new strategy should not be an intellectual “Maginot Line” that only 
codifies NATO’s acquis communautaire. Instead, it must fully reflect the 
broadest possible range of political–military contingencies to avoid 
strategic surprises. 
NATO’s new strategy must contribute to winning the battle of narratives. 
It must serve as a public rallying point to gather support, particularly for 
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the military dimension of security, and be seen as a strategic 
communications tool vis-à-vis an increasingly critical public.300 
In response to these expectations, the New Strategic Concept confirms NATO’s 
commitment to defend allies and their populations from a variety of threats far more than 
only military aggression or nuclear strike.301 The New Concept also recognizes and pays 
attention to modern threats that have arisen in the last decade such as cyber threats, the 
development of technologies that could be applied to violate populations and the 
infrastructure of NATO member states, and a growing interdependency on 
communication lines, transport and transit routes providing allies with information and 
resources necessary for appropriate functioning of states and governments.302 
Subsequently, the New Strategic Concept notes NATO’s commitment to investing in 
common cyber defense capabilities as well as invites an increase in contributions related 
to the protection of the critical infrastructure of energy supplies.303 Yet certain critiques 
must be addressed.  
First of all, the New Strategic Concept has not mentioned hybrid threats per se or 
provided: 
an insight into the magnitude, likelihood, nature, or nuances of the 
emerging security challenges nor addressed the possibility of having to 
face some or many of these challenges simultaneously, or the threat posed 
by the convergence of these separate many elements, which when braided 
together constitute a threat of a different nature.304 
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In response to this argument one should take into account that the New Strategic 
Concept is not a solution itself but should be treated more as a list of strategic directions 
for Allied civilian and military institutions responsible for the implementation of 
common policies. 
Second, the unanswered question is whether the reader and user of the Strategic 
Concept, from the tactical-level operator up to the political-level decision maker, 
understands that the modern threats described in the Concept may emerge in 
combinations where a single response to a cyber-attack or the diversification of natural 
gas supplies does not mean that hybrid threat actor has been deterred and that the “war is 
over.” The Concept does not answer how to deal with such situations, particularly if they 
are created from state actors that NATO considers as partners both politically and 
formally. By no means should NATO’s greatest concentration remain the same, which is 
the deterrence of possible conventional or nuclear threats. Hybrid threats, however, can 
make this task harder because of being applied in earlier phases of conflict before direct 
military or nuclear threat and the NATO Strategic Concept does not provide a clear 
answer in how to deal with such situations.  
3. NATO Strategic Commands and Institutions 
NATO represents a unique organization possessing civilian and military 
institutions that have dealt with different types of threats for more than sixty years. Along 
with the NATO Main Headquarters, Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied 
Command Transformation (ACT) there are also fifteen centers of excellence and 
institutions responsible for intelligence fusion and computer incident response.305 All of 
these institutions contribute in order to provide a better allied response to contemporary 
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threats including those of a hybrid nature. Yet, almost all of these institutions are busy 
with major ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan as well as other issues on NATO’s 
daily agenda such as missile defense, cooperation with Russia, and piracy 
countermeasures in the Gulf of Aden. Theoretically, all of the above-mentioned agendas 
are related to the hybrid war issue. However, at the end of the day there is only some 
activity from the side of Allied Command Transformations in dealing directly with the 
hybrid threat issue.306 In the analysis devoted to hybrid threat problems, the NATO ACT 
concludes, “hybrid threat is more than just the sum total of its constituent parts … 
Combating such threats does not require new capabilities as much as new partners, new 
processes and, above all, new thinking.”307 In order to increase NATO’s capabilities to 
counter hybrid threats, ACT suggests starting closer cooperation between NATO and 
civilian and private organizations that possess specific knowledge and resources, which 
might be helpful for a common purpose in acting against hybrid threat actors.308 But 
before reaching and outsourcing specific intellectual and technical resources, NATO 
needs to be sure that the Alliance has used all of the options it owns to a maximum. It is 
also important to acknowledge that NATO “experts, diplomats, military and defense 
planners have understanding about the new threat environment, there is increased level of 
intelligence sharing among the allies that subsequently results in more qualitative policy 
analysis, which provides that NATO summits and ministerial meetings are no longer 
blessing pre-cooked decisions, but serves as an opportunity for the kind of open dialogue 
which alone can correctly identify the challenges that NATO faces and therefore generate 
the troops, money, and political will essential for success.”309 
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4. NATO Partnerships 
NATO’s partnership with non-NATO member states and with other international, 
regional, and non-governmental organizations is one more solution in helping to protect 
the Allies from hybrid threats. NATO already has experience cooperating with the United 
Nations, as does its subordinated agencies in building common civil-military capabilities 
in cooperating with counter-narcotics operations, crime prevention, and security building 
in the post-conflict zones as well as sharing intelligence information and special technical 
resources.310 Similarly NATO has common interests in providing security in, for 
example, China, Brazil and India where common action in creating a much safer 
cyberspace would be a win-win situation for all involved parties.311 Another example is 
the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan where, under the flag of the Alliance, there are 
twenty-two non-NATO states involved, including Australia, New Zealand, the Republic 
of Korea and Japan.312  
The involvement of partners in NATO operations shows an understanding that 
there is greater value in supporting a global NATO than in dealing with worldwide 
threats without the Alliance. Yet NATO still does not have iron-clad assurances that its 
partner nations will follow Alliance policies or support its attempts in countering 
terrorism and violence in cyberspace. Thus, it is a crucial task for NATO to preserve its 
partnerships and redirect them into new tasks and directions after the war in Afghanistan 
is over.313  
Crisis management, including preventive actions against possible terror acts, 
cyber defense, the elimination of organized crime, piracy and ensuring the non-
proliferation treaty of weapons of mass destruction are some areas in which NATO has 
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long-term goals that could be attained more easily with global partners in all geographical 
directions. One need not doubt that cooperative action in such areas would also be a 
critical factor in eliminating hybrid threats.  
B. RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONS: A NEW MODEL OF 
DETERRENCE? 
Amid such promising elements, one might still ask whether NATO has the right 
model of deterrence to help the Alliance to deter potential adversaries from hostile acts 
against the members of the Alliance. On the one hand, deterrence is fundamental to 
NATO’s strategic position and a well-honed practice since the age of the Cold War.  On 
the other hand, such a basic function also shows the extent to which NATO’s thinking 
has—and has not—changed to accommodate new realities, including hybrid threats. 
Without question, the model of “punishment deterrence” that was effective during 
the Cold War and threatened retaliatory nuclear strike against the Soviet Union if that 
wanted to attack the United States or any other NATO member country is not working in 
the twenty-first century. First, there is no more bipolar world order (where each side was 
absolutely certain whom to deter and how to deter them) that created certain rules of the 
game. In this model of deterrence both the United States and the Soviet Union knew what 
they could expect from each other.  Today, no such certainties exist, meaning deterrence 
must be more nuanced and flexible. 
Second, organizations like Al Qaeda or states like Iran have showed that the threat 
of punishment does not stop their attempts to achieve their political and military goals, 
particularly the acquisition of nuclear weapons.  (The credible possibility of a nuclear 
Iran, for example, acts as its own deterrent to certain kinds of response.) Third, NATO 
can neither politically nor legally respond with a nuclear strike every time the threats are 
other than nuclear.314 Punishment is not the answer how to deter hybrid-threat actor from  
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attacking NATO, especially, when one does that anonymously in cyberspace or using 
economic or political propaganda methods. In this regard experts talk about the concept 
of the tailored deterrence which  
rejects the idea of “one size fits all” preparations. It calls for avoiding self-
centered mirror-imaging and the projection of one’s own values and 
priorities onto others. If “tailored deterrence” is feasible, its proponents 
say, it will be founded on detailed knowledge of particular adversaries and 
their decision-making patterns and priorities, not on a priori assumptions 
about the functioning of deterrence derived from Cold War 
experiences.315 
This model of deterrence requires more work from NATO defense planners 
because they are forced to analyze not only the military capabilities of their potential 
challengers but also their political, economical, cultural and social weaknesses in order to 
use them for better deterrence policy.  
It has been also recognized in the NATO Capstone Concept for the Military 
Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats that “hybrid threats will seek to exploit gaps 
in both the broader security environment and within NATO’s security policy across the 
entire spectrum of conflict,” thus requiring a better understanding of the cultural and 
systemic environment in which the hybrid-threat actor lives as well as more agile 
NATO’s action through the lens of the comprehensive approach.316 From this 
perspective, NATO seems all set to counter hybrid threats—the Strategic Concept 
considers a constellation of different types of threats, from military and nuclear to 
economic, and threats projected by failed states and in cyberspace.317 There is a 
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recognition on the operational level that, as a matter of fact, hybrid threats are real and 
they might be exposed in different domains, not only in the military realm.318  
The issue remains that most of NATO’s means and measures can be introduced in 
practice only when real crisis occurs similar to terrorist attacks against the United States 
or cyber-attacks against Estonia that makes NATO neither proficient at preventing hybrid 
threats nor effective in managing these threats. To hedge against a catastrophic event, 
then, it is most important that NATO designs the right model of deterrence that will be 
effective enough to deter the possible hybrid threat actor not through fear of punishment 
but because NATO can reach hybrid adversaries in dimensions other than conventional or 
nuclear responses. Once NATO proves that violation of its space assets, attacks on 
cyberspace, political sabotage, propaganda actions or sanctions of economic nature 
against its members will be deterred by imposing similar threats to the crucial functions 
and elements important for the existence of hybrid threat actor itself, the danger of hybrid 
threats might be decreased to the level that will not expose lethal threats to NATO 
populations. NATO has all prerequisites to achieve that level. It should only find the right 
balance among its ways and means in order to achieve the desired ends—the adaptation 
to contemporary threats.  
C. WHEN PUSH COMES TO HYBRID SHOVE 
Ready or not, the fact is that NATO is already in hybrid conflict with those actors 
that expose hybrid threats against the Alliance directly or indirectly and it does not have 
full operational capability to engage in such type of conflict for different reasons. First of 
all, NATO has already experienced violence in the cyberspace, most spectacularly 
against its member state Estonia in 2007. Here NATO’s capabilities are limited due to the 
fact that there is not credible and effective international legal regime that could create 
normative environment similar to non-proliferation treaties created to restrict the use and 
spread of weapons of mass destruction. The current international norms that regulate 
questions about collective security, rights for self-defense, jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
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are obsolete because they have been created in order to regulate kinetic conflicts not 
cyber space, which was just science fiction at the time when documents such as the 
Geneva Conventions or the UN Charter were created. NATO is forced to seek its own 
ways to prevent cyber threats, notably in the New Strategic Concept. Still, due to the fact 
that prevention of cyber threats requires combined response from political, diplomatic, 
and military authorities as well the appropriate technological backup, NATO must 
identify those situations where cyber space violence against a member state’s civilian and 
military institutions might be considered an Article 5 situation and when that is minor 
issue and when that might be a part of larger action—hybrid conflict.  
Second, there is hybrid threat actor right in front of NATO that uses wide range of 
assets to increase its political power positions. Russia, though formally a NATO partner, 
has proved that its political, military, and academic authorities are seeking ways to 
restore the country its former status of global superpower. This agenda includes the use 
of direct and indirect violence that undermines NATO presence and defense credibility in 
the neighboring regions of the Russian Federation. The war with Georgia in 2008 was 
first of all information war, a variety of sophisticated provocations and cyber-attacks until 
final phase of conventional invasion into the territory of Georgia. Technically speaking, 
this case does not represent direct attack against NATO, as Georgia has not acceded to 
membership in the Alliance. But it was close enough to demonstrate the need for NATO 
to formulate a response to such a threat constellation, especially projected against its 
weaker members that have common borderline with Russia. 
Even if a hybrid threat never materializes as a full-on Article 5 crisis, the 
unresolved question of the Alliance’s ability to respond weighs heavily on NATO’s 






Collective defense means maintaining the Alliance’s political cohesion 
and military capabilities to deter cohesion and aggression and, if 
necessary, to conduct military operations to restore security and integrity 
of the territory protected by the Alliance’s commitments.319 
In an era of hybrid threats and continuing internal conflicts over burden sharing 
among the allies, it will be challenging enough for NATO leaders to prove that the 
Alliance is still capable of ensuring collective defense effectively with its existing 
capabilities. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite this pessimism showing weaknesses and restrictions of NATO to defend 
from hybrid threats and engage in hybrid conflicts, this thesis has proved that hybrid 
threats do not toll the Alliance’s funeral bell. First of all, through whole its existence 
NATO has survived only because it has been able to adapt and transform its policies and 
capabilities accordingly to the threats exposed to it. Moreover, NATO has been so 
successful in its transformation that its former main adversary—the Soviet Union—no 
longer exists. Meantime, NATO persists, and no one argues the role and importance of 
the Alliance in the global, regional or security architecture.  
Additionally, NATO possesses a variety of strategic tools that have endured the 
test of time and proved to be effective for defense of allies. There is North Atlantic 
Treaty whose spirit and letter in some cases are much stronger than other international 
norms. No matter what kind of threats NATO member states face, they still have their 
rights for consultations under auspices of Article 4. Furthermore, despite their blur nature 
hybrid threats might be a subject of Article 5 conditions thus giving authority for NATO 
to respond against them in robust manner of visible force demonstration.  
Third, NATO adapts its capabilities through strategic concepts that subsequently 
give tasks and authorize NATO strategic commands for further action. The New Strategic  
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Concept recognizes the threat constellation that contributes to hybrid threat concept thus 
paving the basis for further transformation of the Alliance to face and triumph over 
contemporary challenges.  
Fourth, NATO has global partners like Australia, Japan or New Zealand that share 
common democratic values of the NATO member states supporting NATO for decades 
both politically, militarily and through crisis management operations. This cooperation 
narrows the space for hybrid threat actors to operate and manages to provide security 
guarantees of the Alliance far beyond its territories.  
Finally, NATO still has potential to transform its policies and capabilities in order 
to create new model of deterrence that would work in the same manner as Sun Tzu 
philosophy and hybrid threats. In other words, NATO has enough capacities to design 
and demonstrate a “tailored deterrence” against potential hybrid adversaries, thus sending 
the message that beyond direct conventional confrontation, Alliance is able and ready to 
use other ways and means in order to prevent threats exposed to its territory and 
populations. 
Hybrid threats surely do not represent the last new threat or transformational 
impulse that NATO will face in upcoming decades. They might, however, herald the 
tailoring phase between the classic ways of war fighting and a brand new approach of 
waging wars and projecting threats. NATO has recognized the issue and its historic 
capacity to adapt and transform provides the answer for how to prevent other wars, 
including a “hybrid 9/11,” leaving any potential adversary without a chance to undermine 
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